Games 2013, 4(4), 584-607; doi:10.3390/g4040584

Of Coordinators and Dictators: A Public Goods Experiment

1email and 2,3,* email
Received: 17 July 2013; in revised form: 11 September 2013 / Accepted: 8 October 2013 / Published: 10 October 2013
Download PDF [355 KB, uploaded 10 October 2013]
Abstract: We experimentally investigate whether human subjects are willing to give up individual freedom in return for the benefits of improved coordination. We conduct a modified iterated public goods game in which subjects in each period first decide which of two groups to join. One group employs a voluntary contribution mechanism, the other group an allocator contribution mechanism. The setup of the allocator mechanism differs between two treatments. In the coordinator treatment, the randomly selected allocator can set a uniform contribution for all group members, including herself. In the dictator treatment, the allocator can choose different contributions for herself and all other group members. We find that subjects willingly submit to authority in both treatments, even when competing with a voluntary contribution mechanism. The allocator groups achieve high contribution levels in both treatments.
Keywords: allocator; public goods game; self-selection, institution choice, power
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Export to BibTeX |

MDPI and ACS Style

Fleiß, J.; Palan, S. Of Coordinators and Dictators: A Public Goods Experiment. Games 2013, 4, 584-607.

AMA Style

Fleiß J, Palan S. Of Coordinators and Dictators: A Public Goods Experiment. Games. 2013; 4(4):584-607.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Fleiß, Jürgen; Palan, Stefan. 2013. "Of Coordinators and Dictators: A Public Goods Experiment." Games 4, no. 4: 584-607.

Games EISSN 2073-4336 Published by MDPI AG, Basel, Switzerland RSS E-Mail Table of Contents Alert