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Relative Concerns and Delays in Bargaining with Private Information
CORE, University of Louvain, 34 Voie du Roman Pays, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
CEREC, Saint-Louis University, 43 Boulevard du Jardin Botanique, 1000 Brussels, Belgium
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 28 March 2013; in revised form: 27 May 2013 / Accepted: 13 June 2013 / Published: 27 June 2013
Abstract: We consider Rubinstein’s two-person alternating-offer bargaining model with two-sided incomplete information. We investigate the effects of one party having relative concerns about the bargaining outcome and the delay in reaching an agreement. We find that facing an opponent with stronger relative concerns only hurts the bargainer when she is stronger than her opponent. In addition, we show that an increase of one party’s relative concerns will decrease the maximum delay in reaching an agreement.
Keywords: relative concerns; alternating-offer bargaining; private information; maximal delays
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MDPI and ACS Style
Mauleon, A.; Vannetelbosch, V. Relative Concerns and Delays in Bargaining with Private Information. Games 2013, 4, 329-338.
Mauleon A, Vannetelbosch V. Relative Concerns and Delays in Bargaining with Private Information. Games. 2013; 4(3):329-338.
Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent. 2013. "Relative Concerns and Delays in Bargaining with Private Information." Games 4, no. 3: 329-338.