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Games 2013, 4(3), 339-346; doi:10.3390/g4030339
Article

Repeated Play of Families of Games by Resource-Constrained Players

Received: 4 April 2013; in revised form: 28 June 2013 / Accepted: 3 July 2013 / Published: 11 July 2013
Download PDF [309 KB, uploaded 11 July 2013]
Abstract: This paper studies a repeated play of a family of games by resource-constrained players. To economize on reasoning resources, the family of games is partitioned into subsets of games which players do not distinguish. An example is constructed to show that when games are played a finite number of times, partitioning of the game set according to a coarse exogenously given partition might introduce new symmetric equilibrium payoffs which Pareto dominate best equilibrium outcomes with distinguished games. Moreover, these new equilibrium payoffs are also immune to evolutionary pressure at the partition selection stage.
Keywords: evolutionary stability; repeated games; bounded rationality; analogies evolutionary stability; repeated games; bounded rationality; analogies
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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MDPI and ACS Style

Nikandrova, A. Repeated Play of Families of Games by Resource-Constrained Players. Games 2013, 4, 339-346.

AMA Style

Nikandrova A. Repeated Play of Families of Games by Resource-Constrained Players. Games. 2013; 4(3):339-346.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Nikandrova, Arina. 2013. "Repeated Play of Families of Games by Resource-Constrained Players." Games 4, no. 3: 339-346.


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