Next Article in Journal
Next Article in Special Issue
Previous Article in Journal
Previous Article in Special Issue
Games 2012, 3(1), 41-55; doi:10.3390/g3010041
Article

Games with Synergistic Preferences

Received: 26 February 2012; Accepted: 12 March 2012 / Published: 15 March 2012
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Fairness in Games)
View Full-Text   |   Download PDF [93 KB, uploaded 16 March 2012]
Abstract: Players in economic situations often have preferences not only over their own outcome but also over what happens to fellow players, entirely apart from any strategic considerations. While this can be modeled directly by simply writing down final preferences, these are commonly unknown a priori. In many cases it is therefore both helpful and instructive to explicitly model these interactions. This paper presents a simple structure in the context of game theory, building on a model due to Bergstrom, that incorporates these ‘synergisms’ between players. It is powerful enough to cover a wide range of such interactions and model many disparate experimental and empirical results, yet straightforward enough to be used in many applied situations where altruism, or a baser motive, is implied.
Keywords: altruism; interdependent preferences; fairness; cooperation altruism; interdependent preferences; fairness; cooperation
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Export to BibTeX |
EndNote


MDPI and ACS Style

Jamison, J. Games with Synergistic Preferences. Games 2012, 3, 41-55.

AMA Style

Jamison J. Games with Synergistic Preferences. Games. 2012; 3(1):41-55.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Jamison, Julian. 2012. "Games with Synergistic Preferences." Games 3, no. 1: 41-55.

Games EISSN 2073-4336 Published by MDPI AG, Basel, Switzerland RSS E-Mail Table of Contents Alert