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Games 2012, 3(1), 30-40; doi:10.3390/g3010030
Article

Coordination, Differentiation and Fairness in a Population of Cooperating Agents

1,* , 2
 and
2
Received: 2 February 2012 / Revised: 27 February 2012 / Accepted: 29 February 2012 / Published: 5 March 2012
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Abstract

In a recent paper, we analyzed the self-assembly of a complex cooperation network. The network was shown to approach a state where every agent invests the same amount of resources. Nevertheless, highly-connected agents arise that extract extraordinarily high payoffs while contributing comparably little to any of their cooperations. Here, we investigate a variant of the model, in which highly-connected agents have access to additional resources. We study analytically and numerically whether these resources are invested in existing collaborations, leading to a fairer load distribution, or in establishing new collaborations, leading to an even less fair distribution of loads and payoffs.
Keywords: self-organization; coordination; snowdrift game; adaptive network self-organization; coordination; snowdrift game; adaptive network
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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Do, A.-L.; Rudolf, L.; Gross, T. Coordination, Differentiation and Fairness in a Population of Cooperating Agents. Games 2012, 3, 30-40.

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