Games 2011, 2(4), 452-462; doi:10.3390/g2040452
Article

The Resolution Game: A Dual Selves Perspective

1email and 2,* email
Received: 18 July 2011; in revised form: 1 September 2011 / Accepted: 2 December 2011 / Published: 9 December 2011
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Games and Psychology)
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Abstract: This article explains the emergence of an unique equilibrium resolution as the result of a compromise between two selves with different preferences. The stronger this difference is, the more generous the resolution gets. This result is in contrast to predictions of other models in which sinful consumption is distributed bimodally. Therefore, our result fits better with our daily observations concerning a lot of ambivalent goods where we often form nonrigid resolutions. The normative analysis uses the device of a hypothetical impartial self that regards both conflicting motives as equally legitimate. The result of this analysis is dilemmatic. It demonstrates that the resolution is broken too often to be welfare maximal. However, the introduction of external self-commitment devices results in their overuse and is welfare decreasing.
Keywords: dual selves; resolutions; self-control; impartiality
PDF Full-text Download PDF Full-Text [284 KB, uploaded 9 December 2011 16:56 CET]

Export to BibTeX |
EndNote


MDPI and ACS Style

Migrow, D.; Uhl, M. The Resolution Game: A Dual Selves Perspective. Games 2011, 2, 452-462.

AMA Style

Migrow D, Uhl M. The Resolution Game: A Dual Selves Perspective. Games. 2011; 2(4):452-462.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Migrow, Dimitri; Uhl, Matthias. 2011. "The Resolution Game: A Dual Selves Perspective." Games 2, no. 4: 452-462.

Games EISSN 2073-4336 Published by MDPI AG, Basel, Switzerland RSS E-Mail Table of Contents Alert