Games 2011, 2(4), 434-451; doi:10.3390/g2040434
Article

Unraveling Public Good Games

1email and 2,* email
Received: 23 September 2011; in revised form: 9 November 2011 / Accepted: 11 November 2011 / Published: 21 November 2011
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Abstract: This paper provides experimental evidence on how players predict end-game effects in a linear public good game. Our regression analysis yields a measure of the relative importance of priors and signals on subjects’ beliefs on contributions and allows us to conclude that, first, the weight of the signal is relatively unimportant, while priors have a large weight and, second, priors are the same for all periods. Hence, subjects do not expect end-game effects and there is very little updating of beliefs. We argue that the sustainability of cooperation is related to this pattern of belief formation.
Keywords: public good games; end-game effects; beliefs; experiments
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MDPI and ACS Style

Brañas-Garza, P.; Espinosa, M.P. Unraveling Public Good Games. Games 2011, 2, 434-451.

AMA Style

Brañas-Garza P, Espinosa MP. Unraveling Public Good Games. Games. 2011; 2(4):434-451.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Brañas-Garza, Pablo; Espinosa, Maria Paz. 2011. "Unraveling Public Good Games." Games 2, no. 4: 434-451.

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