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Unraveling Public Good Games
GLOBE, Universidad de Granada, Granada 18071, Spain
BRIDGE, Universidad del País Vasco, Bilbao 48015, Spain
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 23 September 2011; in revised form: 9 November 2011 / Accepted: 11 November 2011 / Published: 21 November 2011
Abstract: This paper provides experimental evidence on how players predict end-game effects in a linear public good game. Our regression analysis yields a measure of the relative importance of priors and signals on subjects’ beliefs on contributions and allows us to conclude that, first, the weight of the signal is relatively unimportant, while priors have a large weight and, second, priors are the same for all periods. Hence, subjects do not expect end-game effects and there is very little updating of beliefs. We argue that the sustainability of cooperation is related to this pattern of belief formation.
Keywords: public good games; end-game effects; beliefs; experiments
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MDPI and ACS Style
Brañas-Garza, P.; Espinosa, M.P. Unraveling Public Good Games. Games 2011, 2, 434-451.
Brañas-Garza P, Espinosa MP. Unraveling Public Good Games. Games. 2011; 2(4):434-451.
Brañas-Garza, Pablo; Espinosa, Maria Paz. 2011. "Unraveling Public Good Games." Games 2, no. 4: 434-451.