Previous Issue

Table of Contents

Philosophies, Volume 3, Issue 1 (March 2018)

  • Issues are regarded as officially published after their release is announced to the table of contents alert mailing list.
  • You may sign up for e-mail alerts to receive table of contents of newly released issues.
  • PDF is the official format for papers published in both, html and pdf forms. To view the papers in pdf format, click on the "PDF Full-text" link, and use the free Adobe Readerexternal link to open them.
View options order results:
result details:
Displaying articles 1-2
Export citation of selected articles as:

Editorial

Jump to: Research

Open AccessEditorial Acknowledgement to Reviewers of Philosophies in 2017
Philosophies 2018, 3(1), 1; doi:10.3390/philosophies3010001
Received: 11 January 2018 / Revised: 11 January 2018 / Accepted: 11 January 2018 / Published: 11 January 2018
PDF Full-text (287 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
Abstract
Peer review is an essential part in the publication process, ensuring that Philosophies maintains high quality standards for its published papers [...] Full article

Research

Jump to: Editorial

Open AccessArticle Probabilistic Justification Logic
Philosophies 2018, 3(1), 2; doi:10.3390/philosophies3010002
Received: 30 November 2017 / Revised: 2 February 2018 / Accepted: 13 February 2018 / Published: 16 February 2018
PDF Full-text (287 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
Abstract
Justification logics are constructive analogues of modal logics. They are often used as epistemic logics, particularly as models of evidentialist justification. However, in this role, justification (and modal) logics are defective insofar as they represent justification with a necessity-like operator, whereas actual evidentialist
[...] Read more.
Justification logics are constructive analogues of modal logics. They are often used as epistemic logics, particularly as models of evidentialist justification. However, in this role, justification (and modal) logics are defective insofar as they represent justification with a necessity-like operator, whereas actual evidentialist justification is usually probabilistic. This paper first examines and rejects extant candidates for solving this problem: Milnikel’s Logic of Uncertain Justifications, Ghari’s Hájek–Pavelka-Style Justification Logics and a version of probabilistic justification logic developed by Kokkinis et al. It then proposes a new solution to the problem in the form of a justification logic that incorporates the essential features of both a fuzzy logic and a probabilistic logic. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Logic, Inference, Probability and Paradox)
Back to Top