The Impact of Fiscal Decentralization on Accountability, Economic Freedom, and Political and Civil Liberties in the Americas
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Review of the Literature and Theoretical Foundations
3. Data and Methodology
4. Results of the Empirical Estimation
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A
Country | Sub-National Government Revenues to General Government Expenditures (%) | Sub-National Government Expenditures to General Government Expenditures (%) | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Period | Average Whole Period | Highest (year) | Lowest (year) | Period | Average Whole Period | Highest (year) | Lowest (year) | |
Argentina | 1990, 2000, 2005, 2007–2015 | 37.35 | 45.59 (2015) | 21.17 (2005) | 1980–2013 | 42.52 | 51.51 (2006) | 24.05 (1982) |
Bolivia | 1985–2014 | 31.05 | 46.17 (2003) | 15.14 (1985) | 1986–2014 | 27.57 | 36.98 (1997) | 14.95 (1986) |
Brazil | 2000–2014 | 54.01 | 62.47 (2014) | 49.19 (2005) | 2006–2012 | 52.34 | 54.73 (2008) | 50.76 (2009) |
Canada | 1979–2014 | 72.59 | 78.10 (2010) | 69.35 (1989) | 2000–2014 | 73.30 | 77.59 (2014) | 68.19 (2000) |
Chile | 1974–2014 | 8.56 | 14.06 (2002) | 2.75 (1974) | 2000–2001 | 13.35 | 13.50 (2000) | 13.20 (2001) |
Colombia | 1990, 1998–2003, 2005, 2010, 2014 | 33.94 | 46.39 (1999) | 20.56 (2005) | 1998–2000 | 39.33 | 40.16 (2000) | 38.76 (1998) |
Costa Rica | 2000–2014 | 5.01 | 6.95 (2007) | 3.19 (2000) | 2002–2007 | 3.98 | 6.35 (2005) | 3.08 (2002) |
El Salvador | 2002–2010 | 7.61 | 10.11 (2009) | 4.54 (2002) | na | na | na | na |
Mexico | 1972–2013 | 29.63 | 44.76 (2009) | 18.96 (1989) | 1990–2013 | 44.58 | 59.66 (1997) | 27.60 (1990) |
Paraguay | 2005–2012 | 8.92 | 10.86 (2012) | 7.73 (2010) | 2005–2012 | 9.34 | 11.17 (2012) | 8.02 (2010) |
Peru | 1995–2012 | 30.42 | 39.19 (2009) | 21.50 (1998) | 1995–2012 | 30.00 | 40.88 (2012) | 21.08 (1998) |
United States | 1980–2014 | 56.13 | 60.77 (1992) | 51.48 (2013) | 1990–2014 | 51.50 | 59.85 (2000) | 46.27 (2011) |
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1 | Fiscal decentralization can be understood as a narrower component of economic decentralization, which may include the power to legislate one’s own norms on aspects as varied as fiscal, monetary, trade, and industrial policies. Here, the more limited focus centers on a region’s ability to tax (i.e., generate its own sources of revenue) and spend resources without the overt control of a central authority (i.e., the central or national government). |
2 | The issue of administrative decentralization and political power is central in the fields of Public Administration and Political Science, as evidenced, for instance, in (Kaufman 1969; Rodden 2002; Schmidt 1990), but little research on this topic is found in the economics literature. |
3 | Available at https://www.imf.org/en/Data. |
4 | Argentina: Comisión Federal de Impuestos (www.cfi.gov.ar) and Ministerio de Hacienda y Finanzas Públicas (www.economia.gob.ar); Bolivia: Instituto Nacional de Estadística (www.ine.gob.bo). |
5 | |
6 | |
7 | The 12 countries are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and the United States. |
8 | The appendix reports summary statistics and the specific time periods of available data for the countries utilized in the study. An important point highlighted here is that even though the data range for the full sample is from 1972 to 2015, availability of data for each of the 12 countries varies greatly, hence the unbalanced panel data set. |
9 | The two indices of political rights and civil liberties, as well as a qualitative assessment of the degree of liberty of each nation, are available at https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.VY_fWI1RHcw. Here, the two indices and the qualitative assessment have been combined into a single index of political and civil liberties. It ranges from 0.18 (highest level of liberties) to 1.00 (lowest level of liberties). The combined ratio was constructed as follows: Freedom House assigns a score of 1 to 7 for political rights (1 = highest degree of freedom; 7 = lowest degree of freedom) and a similar score of 1 to 7 for civil liberties (1 = highest degree of freedom; 7 = lowest degree of freedom). Additionally, it provides a qualitative assessment of the overall degree of freedom of each nation. The three broad categories that comprise this qualitative assessment were assigned a numerical value (free = 1; partly free = 2; not free = 3). By summing the individual scores of each country in these 3 categories and dividing it by the highest possible score that a country could get (17 = 7 + 7 + 3), a combined ratio of political and civil liberties is obtained for all countries of interest. The higher (lower) this combined ratio is, the lower (higher) the degree of political and civil liberties in a country. |
10 | Available at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#doc. |
11 | The four broad categories that serve as benchmarks for constructing the index are rule of law, limited government—this category includes the theme of fiscal freedom, which measures the tax burden imposed by government but does not consider or account for the extent of a decentralized government structure—regulatory efficiency, and open markets. It ranges from 0 to 100, where lower numbers represent lower levels of economic freedom and higher scores represent higher levels of economic freedom. Specifically, 0–49.9 (repressed); 50–59.9 (mostly unfree); 60–69.9 (moderately free); 70–79.9 (mostly free); and 80–100 (free). Available at: http://www.heritage.org/index/. |
12 | |
13 | From 1972 to 1989, the Penn World Tables is the primary source (available at: https://pwt.sas.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php). The World Bank through its World Development Indicators is the main source thereafter (available at: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators). |
14 | Available at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#doc. |
15 | Source for all these data is the World Bank (World Development Indicators). |
16 | Source of data for the inflation rate and gross domestic savings is the World Bank (World Development Indicators). |
17 | Available at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#doc. |
18 | Available at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#doc. |
19 | Source of data for literacy and unemployment rates is the World Bank (World Development Indicators). |
20 | Specifically, for all IVs and GMM regressions, the Prais-Winsten Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) Within estimator was estimated in order to correct for serial correlation (cross sectional and intrasectional correlation). |
21 | As was previously noted, the combined ratio of political and civil liberties ranges from 0.18 (highest level of liberties) to 1.00 (lowest level of liberties). For easier interpretation of results, this ratio has been inverted in all regressions so that higher (lower) values represent higher (lower) levels of liberties. The pairwise correlations presented in Table 1 also correspond to this inverted ratio. |
22 | When decentralization occurs on the expenditure side, the results indicate that with the Heritage Foundation-WSJ index the pattern of behavior is similar to the one occurring on the revenue side, but the results obtained with the Fraser index are indeterminate, noting that decentralization can have differing effects on freedom, pending on whether this process is revenue- or expenditure-based. |
23 | The impact of decentralization on the Fraser index of economic freedom is indeterminate. |
24 |
Ratio Political and Civil Liberties | Kaufmann Voice Accountability Index | WSJ Economic Freedom Index | Fraser Economic Freedom Index | Revenue Decentralization | Revenue Decentralization Squared | Expenditure Decentralization | Expenditure Decentralization Squared | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Ratio political and civil liberties | 1 | 0.952/0.842 | 0.730/0.173 | 0.757/0.287 | 0.563/−0.170 | 0.670/−0.057 | 0.524/−0.140 | 0.621/−0.023 |
Kaufmann voice accountability index | 0.952/0.842 | 1 | 0.729/0.145 | 0.758/0.235 | 0.634/−0.095 | 0.747/0.030 | 0.611/−0.035 | 0.716/0.107 |
WSJ economic freedom index | 0.730/0.173 | 0.729/0.145 | 1 | 0.851/0.678 | 0.496/−0.203 | 0.577/−0.202 | 0.421/−0.275 | 0.496/−0.297 |
Fraser economic freedom index | 0.757/0.287 | 0.758/0.235 | 0.851/0.678 | 1 | 0.396/−0.423 | 0.492/−0.437 | 0.348/−0.433 | 0.438/−0.440 |
Revenue decentralization | 0.563/−0.170 | 0.634/−0.095 | 0.496/−0.203 | 0.396/−0.423 | 1 | 0.959/0.965 | 0.943/0.882 | 0.897/0.799 |
Revenue decentralization squared | 0.670/−0.057 | 0.747/0.030 | 0.577/−0.202 | 0.492/−0.437 | 0.959/0.965 | 1 | 0.907/0.819 | 0.943/0.786 |
Expenditure decentralization | 0.524/−0.140 | 0.611/−0.035 | 0.421/−0.275 | 0.348/−0.433 | 0.943/0.882 | 0.907/0.819 | 1 | 0.957/0.967 |
Expenditure decentralization squared | 0.621/−0.023 | 0.716/0.107 | 0.496/−0.297 | 0.438/−0.440 | 0.897/0.799 | 0.943/0.786 | 0.957/0.967 | 1 |
Independent variable | Dep. Variable: (Inverse) Ratio of Political and Civil Liberties | Dep. Variable: Kaufmann Indicator of Voice Accountability | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Two-Stage EGLS | GMM | Two-Stage EGLS | GMM | |||||
Revenue | Expenditure | Revenue | Expenditure | Revenue | Expenditure | Revenue | Expenditure | |
Revenue decentralization (% of general gov exp) | −0.080 *** | −0.079 ** | −0.967 *** | −1.003 *** | ||||
(0.016) | (0.038) | (0.103) | (0.271) | |||||
Revenue decentralization squared | 0.001 *** | 0.001 | 0.012 *** | 0.012 * | ||||
(0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.007) | |||||
Expenditure decentralization (% of general gov exp) | −0.040 * | −0.048 ** | −0.542 *** | −0.662 *** | ||||
(0.022) | (0.023) | (0.185) | (0.187) | |||||
Expenditure decentralization squared | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.007 *** | 0.008 *** | ||||
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.003) | (0.003) | |||||
GDP per capita growth (PPP converted) | 0.227 *** | 0.054 | 0.293 | 0.151 | 1.448 *** | 0.817 | 2.028 | 1.099 |
(0.080) | (0.101) | (0.518) | (0.126) | (0.502) | (1.633) | (3.741) | (1.028) | |
Inflation rate (%) | 0.041 ** | 0.024 | 0.045 | −0.009 | 0.327 *** | −0.058 | 0.287 | −0.230 |
(0.016) | (0.042) | (0.051) | (0.045) | (0.083) | (0.572) | (0.368) | (0.366) | |
Gross domestic savings (% of GDP) | 0.001 | −0.059 | −0.009 | −0.093 | 0.280 *** | −0.439 | 0.272 | −0.438 |
(0.001) | (0.001) | (0.070) | (0.058) | (0.056) | (0.028) | (0.506) | (0.477) | |
Urban population (% of total) | −0.007 | 0.004 | −0.008 | 0.016 | −0.062 | 0.042 | −0.006 | 0.137 |
(0.010) | (0.015) | (0.024) | (0.016) | (0.071) | (0.188) | (0.017) | (0.013) | |
Internet users (per 100 people) | 0.034 *** | 0.010 * | 0.035 * | 0.008 | 0.226 *** | 0.136 *** | 0.207 | 0.126 |
(0.004) | (0.005) | (0.019) | (0.011) | (0.021) | (0.048) | (0.139) | (0.093) | |
Kaufmann index government effectiveness | 0.014 * | −0.004 | 0.024 | −0.006 | 0.245 *** | 0.126 * | 0.291 | 0.153 |
(0.008) | (0.010) | (0.032) | (0.014) | (0.040) | (0.071) | (0.229) | (0.112) | |
Government debt (% of GDP) | 0.012 *** | 0.006 ** | 0.008 | 0.007 | 0.154 *** | 0.042 | 0.163 | 0.063 |
(0.004) | (0.003) | (0.027) | (0.008) | (0.033) | (0.033) | (0.193) | (0.067) | |
Gini (0 = perfect equality; 1 = perfect inequality) | 0.058 *** | −0.035 | 0.075 | −0.045 | 0.201 ** | −0.114 | 0.321 | −0.148 |
(0.019) | (0.022) | (0.143) | (0.056) | (0.099) | (0.244) | (1.033) | (0.455) | |
Kaufmann index for corruption | 0.025 *** | 0.046 *** | 0.017 | 0.037 ** | 0.276 *** | 0.378 *** | 0.240 | 0.312 ** |
(0.010) | (0.013) | (0.028) | (0.018) | (0.038) | (0.141) | (0.204) | (0.147) | |
Adj. R2 | 0.83 | 0.95 | 0.50 | 0.80 | 0.97 | 0.98 | 0.84 | 0.92 |
number of observations | 141 | 103 | 141 | 103 | 141 | 103 | 141 | 103 |
Independent variable | Dep. Variable: (Inverse) Ratio of Political and Civil Liberties | Dep. Variable: Kaufmann Indicator of Voice Accountability | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Two-Stage EGLS | GMM | Two-Stage EGLS | GMM | |||||
Revenue | Expenditure | Revenue | Expenditure | Revenue | Expenditure | Revenue | Expenditure | |
Revenue decentralization (% of general gov exp) | −0.089 | −0.079 | −1.226 *** | −1.130 *** | ||||
(0.090) | (0.069) | (0.191) | (0.213) | |||||
Revenue decentralization squared | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.015 *** | 0.013 *** | ||||
(0.001) | (0.001) | (0.003) | (0.003) | |||||
Expenditure decentralization (% of general gov exp) | −0.050 | −0.023 | −0.661 * | −0.854 *** | ||||
(0.039) | (0.108) | (0.398) | (0.263) | |||||
Expenditure decentralization squared | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.008 | 0.011 *** | ||||
(0.000) | (0.002) | (0.007) | (0.004) | |||||
GDP per capita growth (PPP converted) | 0.648 * | 0.093 | 0.319 | 0.144 | 0.491 | −0.002 | 0.030 | 0.097 |
(0.401) | (0.096) | (0.507) | (0.394) | (0.424) | (2.510) | (0.860) | (1.418) | |
Inflation rate (%) | 0.061 | 0.010 | 0.024 | 0.014 | 0.335 *** | 0.161 | 0.213 | −0.244 |
(0.049) | (0.035) | (0.049) | (0.044) | (0.095) | (0.795) | (0.192) | (0.363) | |
Gross domestic savings (% of GDP) | −0.079 | −0.084 ** | −0.033 | −0.093 | 0.482 *** | −0.232 | 0.574 ** | −0.375 |
(0.057) | (0.035) | (0.072) | (0.126) | (0.067) | (0.549) | (0.219) | (0.546) | |
Urban population (% of total) | 0.023 | 0.012 | −0.020 | 0.015 | −0.015 | −0.012 | −0.021 | 0.194 |
(0.049) | (0.023) | (0.036) | (0.058) | (0.122) | (0.438) | (0.130) | (0.317) | |
Internet users (per 100 people) | 0.059 *** | 0.011 * | 0.048 ** | 0.009 | 0.168 *** | 0.162 ** | 0.153 ** | 0.163 |
(0.021) | (0.006) | (0.019) | (0.022) | (0.047) | (0.080) | (0.080) | (0.104) | |
Kaufmann index government effectiveness | 0.028 * | −0.008 | 0.031 | −0.004 | 0.221 *** | 0.166 ** | 0.245 *** | 0.171 |
(0.017) | (0.011) | (0.025) | (0.026) | (0.041) | (0.077) | (0.075) | (0.116) | |
Government debt (% of GDP) | −0.023 | 0.008 | −0.007 | 0.003 | 0.216 *** | 0.105 | 0.265 ** | 0.063 |
(0.021) | (0.009) | (0.036) | (0.041) | (0.042) | (0.214) | (0.116) | (0.158) | |
Gini (0 = perfect equality; 1 = perfect inequality) | 0.276 ** | −0.045 | 0.159 | −0.014 | −0.181 | −0.119 | −0.262 | 0.062 |
(0.137) | (0.064) | (0.171) | (0.220) | (0.170) | (0.888) | (0.443) | (0.976) | |
Kaufmann index for corruption | −0.015 | 0.042 ** | 0.001 | 0.041 | 0.281 *** | 0.365 | 0.289 *** | 0.248 |
(0.028) | (0.018) | (0.033) | (0.045) | (0.055) | (0.289) | (0.077) | (0.233) | |
Adj. R2 | 0.38 | 0.68 | 0.49 | 0.34 | 0.97 | 0.92 | 0.92 | 0.72 |
Number of observations | 115 | 81 | 115 | 81 | 115 | 81 | 115 | 81 |
Dep. Variable: Heritage Foundation-WSJ Index of Economic Freedom | Dep. Variable: Fraser Institute Index of Economic Freedom | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Independent variable | Two-Stage EGLS | GMM | Two-Stage EGLS | GMM | ||||
Revenue | Expenditure | Revenue | Expenditure | Revenue | Expenditure | Revenue | Expenditure | |
Revenue decentralization (% of general gov exp) | 0.555 *** | 0.516 *** | 0.029 *** | 0.017 ** | ||||
(0.054) | (0.102) | (0.004) | (0.007) | |||||
Revenue decentralization squared | −0.007 *** | −0.007 *** | −0.000 *** | −0.000 *** | ||||
(0.001) | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |||||
Expenditure decentralization (% of general gov exp) | 0.368 * | 0.376 | −0.002 | −0.011 | ||||
(0.193) | (0.252) | (0.027) | (0.025) | |||||
Expenditure decentralization squared | −0.005 *** | −0.005 * | −0.000 | −0.000 | ||||
(0.002) | (0.003) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |||||
GDP per capita at PPP (logs) | 2.587 ** | 4.225 ** | 3.207 * | 6.115 ** | 0.024 | 0.079 | 0.069 | −0.015 |
(1.151) | (1.757) | (1.860) | (2.354) | (0.057) | (0.133) | (0.088) | (0.170) | |
Gini (0 = perfect equality; 1 = perfect inequality) | −0.075 | −0.392 ** | −0.065 | −0.238 | −0.071 *** | −0.120 *** | −0.068 *** | −0.101 *** |
(0.062) | (0.203) | (0.117) | (0.270) | (0.007) | (0.014) | (0.010) | (0.017) | |
Internet users (per 100 people) | 0.128 *** | −0.061 | 0.119 *** | −0.018 | 0.002 | −0.009 *** | 0.001 | 0.003 |
(0.019) | (0.046) | (0.038) | (0.074) | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.002) | (0.006) | |
Kaufmann index for rule of law | 0.285 *** | 0.291 *** | 0.240 *** | 0.225 ** | 0.039 *** | 0.032 *** | 0.035 *** | 0.021 ** |
(0.022) | (0.073) | (0.048) | (0.102) | (0.002) | (0.008) | (0.003) | (0.008) | |
General government debt (% of GDP) | −0.213 *** | −0.106 *** | −0.209 *** | −0.140 *** | −0.011 *** | −0.005 ** | −0.009 *** | −0.007 * |
(0.019) | (0.028) | (0.024) | (0.037) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.004) | |
Kaufmann index government effectiveness | 0.194 *** | 0.070 | 0.236 *** | 0.119 | −0.008 ** | −0.007 | −0.007 | 0.005 |
(0.029) | (0.084) | (0.062) | (0.118) | (0.003) | (0.010) | (0.004) | (0.010) | |
Urban population (% of total) | −0.590 *** | −0.332 *** | −0.577 *** | −0.505 *** | −0.031 *** | −0.004 | −0.022 *** | −0.004 |
(0.039) | (0.075) | (0.058) | (0.126) | (0.004) | (0.008) | (0.004) | (0.011) | |
Literacy rate (% of people, ages 15 and above) | −1.183 *** | −0.939 *** | −1.151 *** | −1.022 ** | −0.089 *** | −0.135 *** | −0.077 *** | −0.128 *** |
(0.060) | (0.333) | (0.088) | (0.410) | (0.007) | (0.042) | (0.011) | (0.042) | |
Unemployment rate (% of total labor force) | 0.817 *** | 1.216 *** | 0.771 *** | 1.541 *** | 0.001 | 0.069 *** | −0.008 | 0.065 ** |
(0.090) | (0.198) | (0.126) | (0.308) | (0.007) | (0.023) | (0.010) | (0.026) | |
Adj. R2 | 0.92 | 0.87 | 0.87 | 0.82 | 0.97 | 0.95 | 0.96 | 0.87 |
number of observations | 141 | 103 | 141 | 103 | 141 | 103 | 141 | 103 |
Dep. Variable: Heritage Foundation-WSJ Index of Economic Freedom | Dep. Variable: Fraser Institute Index of Economic Freedom | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Independent variable | Two-Stage EGLS | GMM | Two-Stage EGLS | GMM | ||||
Revenue | Expenditure | Revenue | Expenditure | Revenue | Expenditure | Revenue | Expenditure | |
Revenue decentralization (% of general gov exp) | 0.665 *** | 0.553 *** | 0.013 | −0.002 | ||||
(0.138) | (0.198) | (0.011) | (0.014) | |||||
Revenue decentralization squared | −0.011 *** | −0.009 *** | −0.000 *** | −0.000 | ||||
(0.002) | (0.003) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |||||
Expenditure decentralization (% of general gov exp) | 0.389 | 0.730 | −0.043 | −0.069 | ||||
(0.466) | (0.634) | (0.046) | (0.062) | |||||
Expenditure decentralization squared | −0.007 | −0.013 | 0.000 | 0.001 | ||||
(0.006) | (0.009) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |||||
GDP per capita at PPP (logs) | 6.205 *** | 6.589 ** | 5.624 ** | 11.077 *** | 0.025 | −0.296 | −0.003 | −0.482 |
(2.133) | (3.283) | (2.535) | (3.912) | (0.123) | (0.281) | (0.137) | (0.403) | |
Gini (0 = perfect equality; 1 = perfect inequality) | 0.290 ** | −0.818 *** | 0.175 | −0.751 ** | −0.021 * | −0.170 *** | −0.014 | −0.183 *** |
(0.138) | (0.260) | (0.186) | (0.354) | (0.012) | (0.042) | (0.017) | (0.046) | |
Internet users (per 100 people) | 0.106 *** | −0.151 *** | 0.060 | −0.186 ** | 0.012 *** | −0.011 | 0.014 *** | 0.001 |
(0.037) | (0.055) | (0.047) | (0.086) | (0.002) | (0.007) | (0.003) | (0.009) | |
Kaufmann index for rule of law | 0.259*** | 0.260 ** | 0.207 ** | 0.274 * | 0.024 *** | 0.030 ** | 0.018 *** | 0.020 |
(0.056) | (0.109) | (0.080) | (0.161) | (0.003) | (0.016) | (0.006) | (0.017) | |
General government debt (% of GDP) | −0.175 *** | −0.065 ** | −0.192 *** | −0.074 ** | −0.008 *** | −0.002 | −0.006 *** | −0.003 |
(0.020) | (0.025) | (0.030) | (0.033) | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.002) | (0.004) | |
Kaufmann index government effectiveness | 0.166 *** | 0.052 | 0.194 ** | 0.046 | 0.002 | −0.011 | 0.009 | 0.003 |
(0.058) | (0.099) | (0.078) | (0.151) | (0.003) | (0.014) | (0.005) | (0.016) | |
Urban population (% of total) | −0.552 *** | −0.318 | −0.494 *** | −0.557 ** | −0.023 *** | 0.012 | −0.020 ** | 0.006 |
(0.065) | (0.199) | (0.092) | (0.231) | (0.008) | (0.020) | (0.009) | (0.024) | |
Literacy rate (% of people, ages 15 and above) | −1.202 *** | −1.313 *** | −1.104 *** | −1.227 ** | −0.094 *** | −0.174 *** | −0.079 *** | −0.205 *** |
(0.078) | (0.424) | (0.102) | (0.612) | (0.009) | (0.046) | (0.012) | (0.068) | |
Unemployment rate (% of total labor force) | 0.586 *** | 1.430 *** | 0.559 *** | 1.883 *** | −0.022 *** | 0.064 * | −0.029 ** | 0.087 ** |
(0.123) | (0.360) | (0.167) | (0.387) | (0.008) | (0.035) | (0.012) | (0.044) | |
Adj. R2 | 0.92 | 0.89 | 0.87 | 0.85 | 0.96 | 0.62 | 0.92 | 0.42 |
number of observations | 115 | 81 | 115 | 81 | 115 | 81 | 115 | 81 |
Country | Political and Civil Liberties | Kaufmann Voice Accountability | WSJ Economic Freedom Index | Fraser Economic Freedom Index | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Revenues | Expenditures | Revenues | Expenditures | Revenues | Expenditures | Revenues | Expenditures | |
Argentina | 0.51 | 0.52 | 0.75 | 0.65 | 0.27 | 0.62 | 0.46 | 0.83 |
Bolivia | 0.58 | 0.98 | 0.60 | 0.62 | 0.89 | 0.97 | 0.81 | 0.62 |
Brazil | 0.50 | 0.60 | 0.75 | 0.70 | 0.78 | 0.67 | 0.78 | 0.72 |
Canada | 1.00 | 1.00 | 2.16 | 1.55 | −1.23 | −0.10 | 1.20 | 1.28 |
Chile | −0.35 | −3.92 | −18.96 | −20.46 | −4.55 | −8.50 | −5.35 | −14.72 |
Colombia | 0.32 | 0.06 | 0.41 | −0.03 | 0.82 | 0.48 | 0.71 | 0.62 |
Costa Rica | −73.08 | −199.22 | −23.68 | −67.78 | −3.49 | 28.95 | 5.05 | −40.18 |
El Salvador | 0.50 | Na | 2.64 | na | 4.02 | na | −5.86 | Na |
Mexico | 0.52 | 0.42 | 0.61 | 0.59 | 0.80 | 0.77 | 0.79 | 0.80 |
Paraguay | 0.37 | 0.37 | 45.61 | 28.41 | 37.20 | 25.02 | 31.45 | 20.67 |
Peru | 0.16 | 0.22 | 0.47 | 0.50 | 0.90 | 1.01 | 0.98 | 0.93 |
United States | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
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Bojanic, A.N. The Impact of Fiscal Decentralization on Accountability, Economic Freedom, and Political and Civil Liberties in the Americas. Economies 2018, 6, 8. https://doi.org/10.3390/economies6010008
Bojanic AN. The Impact of Fiscal Decentralization on Accountability, Economic Freedom, and Political and Civil Liberties in the Americas. Economies. 2018; 6(1):8. https://doi.org/10.3390/economies6010008
Chicago/Turabian StyleBojanic, Antonio N. 2018. "The Impact of Fiscal Decentralization on Accountability, Economic Freedom, and Political and Civil Liberties in the Americas" Economies 6, no. 1: 8. https://doi.org/10.3390/economies6010008