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Games 2018, 9(3), 51; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030051

Voluntary Leadership and Asymmetric Endowments in the Investment Game

1
Universität Erfurt, Professur für Quantitative Methoden der Empirischen Sozialforschung and CEREB (Center for Empirical Research in Economics and Behavioral Sciences), Nordhäuser Str. 63, D-99089 Erfurt, Germany
2
Universität Erfurt, Professur für Angewandte Mikroökonomie and CEREB, Nordhäuser Str. 63, D-99089 Erfurt, Germany
3
Center for Empirical Research in Economics and Behavioral Sciences, Nordhäuser Str. 63, D-99089 Erfurt, Germany
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 1 May 2018 / Revised: 10 July 2018 / Accepted: 15 July 2018 / Published: 21 July 2018
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Dictator Games)
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Abstract

We experimentally investigate variants of the investment game by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995), in which one of the two players decides who are first mover and second mover. It has been shown by Kleine, Königstein, and Rozsnyói (2014) that voluntary leadership increases both investment and backtransfer. We interpret voluntary leadership as a signal of cooperation that stimulates reciprocal cooperation. If a relatively rich player takes the lead (putting himself/herself under investment risk) this should be seen as a less strong signal of cooperation than taking the lead among equally endowed players. Indeed, we show that under asymmetric endowments, voluntary leadership has a weaker effect than under symmetric endowments. View Full-Text
Keywords: experiment; cooperation; leadership; endowment asymmetry experiment; cooperation; leadership; endowment asymmetry
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. (CC BY 4.0).
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Kleine, F.; Königstein, M.; Rozsnyói, B. Voluntary Leadership and Asymmetric Endowments in the Investment Game. Games 2018, 9, 51.

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