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Games 2017, 8(4), 52; doi:10.3390/g8040052

Public-Goods Games with Endogenous Institution-Formation: Experimental Evidence on the Effect of the Voting Rule

1
School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, Nishiwaseda 1-6-1, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-8050, Japan
2
Department of Economics, Lancaster University Management School, Bailrigg, Lancaster LA1 4YX, UK
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 15 September 2017 / Revised: 30 October 2017 / Accepted: 3 November 2017 / Published: 2 December 2017
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Public Good Games)
View Full-Text   |   Download PDF [275 KB, uploaded 2 December 2017]

Abstract

We report experimental results on voluntary contributions to public-goods provision from situations in which parties can create institutions to impose a certain contribution level on its members. We focus on a public-goods game where the joint decisions inside the institution are made based on the plurality voting rule. We show that, comparing to the unanimity voting rule, the plurality rule results in a significant and large decrease in the institution initiation rate, along with a significant and large increase in the institution implementation rate. In the end, as the two effects cancel each other out, the choice of the voting rule does not significantly affect the average contribution level or efficiency. View Full-Text
Keywords: institution formation; laboratory experiment; plurality voting; public-goods game; unanimity voting institution formation; laboratory experiment; plurality voting; public-goods game; unanimity voting
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. (CC BY 4.0).

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MDPI and ACS Style

Funaki, Y.; Li, J.; Veszteg, R.F. Public-Goods Games with Endogenous Institution-Formation: Experimental Evidence on the Effect of the Voting Rule. Games 2017, 8, 52.

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