Next Article in Journal
Dual-Process Reasoning in Charitable Giving: Learning from Non-Results
Previous Article in Journal
The Impact of Previous Action on Bargaining—An Experiment on the Emergence of Preferences for Fairness Norms
Article Menu

Export Article

Open AccessArticle
Games 2017, 8(3), 35; https://doi.org/10.3390/g8030035

Cooperation in Public Goods Games: Stay, But Not for Too Long

1
Departamento de Física, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Caixa Postal 702, Belo Horizonte CEP 30161-970, MG, Brazil
2
Instituto de Física, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Caixa Postal 15051, Porto Alegre CEP 91501-970, RS, Brazil
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 16 June 2017 / Revised: 10 July 2017 / Accepted: 15 August 2017 / Published: 18 August 2017
Full-Text   |   PDF [698 KB, uploaded 18 August 2017]   |  

Abstract

Cooperation in repeated public goods game is hardly achieved, unless contingent behavior is present. Surely, if mechanisms promoting positive assortment between cooperators are present, then cooperators may beat defectors, because cooperators would collect greater payoffs. In the context of evolutionary game theory, individuals that always cooperate cannot win the competition against defectors in well-mixed populations. Here, we study the evolution of a population where fitness is obtained in repeated public goods games and players have a fixed probability of playing the next round. As a result, the group size decreases during the game. The population is well-mixed and there are only two available strategies: always cooperate (ALLC) or always defect (ALLD). Through numerical calculation and analytical approximations we show that cooperation can emerge if the players stay playing the game, but not for too long. The essential mechanism is the interaction between the transition from strong to weak altruism, as the group size decreases, and the existence of an upper limit to the number of rounds representing limited time availability. View Full-Text
Keywords: evolutionary game theory; public goods game; repeated games; fixation probability evolutionary game theory; public goods game; repeated games; fixation probability
Figures

Figure 1

This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. (CC BY 4.0).
SciFeed

Share & Cite This Article

MDPI and ACS Style

Wardil, L.; Amaral, M.A. Cooperation in Public Goods Games: Stay, But Not for Too Long. Games 2017, 8, 35.

Show more citation formats Show less citations formats

Note that from the first issue of 2016, MDPI journals use article numbers instead of page numbers. See further details here.

Related Articles

Article Metrics

Article Access Statistics

1

Comments

[Return to top]
Games EISSN 2073-4336 Published by MDPI AG, Basel, Switzerland RSS E-Mail Table of Contents Alert
Back to Top