Multi-Leader Multi-Follower Model with Aggregative Uncertainty
AbstractWe study a non-cooperative game with aggregative structure, namely when the payoffs depend on the strategies of the opponent players through an aggregator function. We assume that a subset of players behave as leaders in a Stackelberg model. The leaders, as well the followers, act non-cooperatively between themselves and solve a Nash equilibrium problem. We assume an exogenous uncertainty affecting the aggregator and we obtain existence results for the stochastic resulting game. Some examples are illustrated. View Full-Text
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Mallozzi, L.; Messalli, R. Multi-Leader Multi-Follower Model with Aggregative Uncertainty. Games 2017, 8, 25.
Mallozzi L, Messalli R. Multi-Leader Multi-Follower Model with Aggregative Uncertainty. Games. 2017; 8(3):25.Chicago/Turabian Style
Mallozzi, Lina; Messalli, Roberta. 2017. "Multi-Leader Multi-Follower Model with Aggregative Uncertainty." Games 8, no. 3: 25.
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