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Games 2017, 8(1), 7; doi:10.3390/g8010007

Social Pressure and Environmental Effects on Networks: A Path to Cooperation

1
GISC (Grupo Interdisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos), Departamento de Matemáticas, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 28911 Leganés, Spain
2
LABSS (Laboratory of Agent Based Social Simulation), Institute of Cognitive Science and Technology, National Research Council (CNR), Via Palestro 32, 00185 Rome, Italy
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Academic Editors: Attila Szolnoki and Ulrich Berger
Received: 29 November 2016 / Revised: 29 December 2016 / Accepted: 10 January 2017 / Published: 14 January 2017
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Evolutionary Games and Statistical Physics of Social Networks)
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Abstract

In this paper, we study how the pro-social impact due to the vigilance by other individuals is conditioned by both environmental and evolutionary effects. To this aim, we consider a known model where agents play a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG) among themselves and the pay-off matrix of an individual changes according to the number of neighbors that are “vigilant”, i.e., how many neighbors watch out for her behavior. In particular, the temptation to defect decreases linearly with the number of vigilant neighbors. This model proved to support cooperation in specific conditions, and here we check its robustness with different topologies, microscopical update rules and initial conditions. By means of many numerical simulations and few theoretical considerations, we find in which situations the vigilance by the others is more effective in favoring cooperative behaviors and when its influence is weaker. View Full-Text
Keywords: cooperation; prisoner’s dilemma; evolutionary dynamics; monitoring hypothesis cooperation; prisoner’s dilemma; evolutionary dynamics; monitoring hypothesis
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Pereda, M.; Vilone, D. Social Pressure and Environmental Effects on Networks: A Path to Cooperation. Games 2017, 8, 7.

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