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Games 2017, 8(1), 3; doi:10.3390/g8010003

Strategy Constrained by Cognitive Limits, and the Rationality of Belief-Revision Policies

National Coalition of Independent Scholars; Ronin Institute; Lititz, PA 17543, USA
Academic Editors: Paul Weirich and Ulrich Berger
Received: 1 September 2016 / Revised: 20 December 2016 / Accepted: 22 December 2016 / Published: 3 January 2017
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Epistemic Game Theory and Logic)
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Abstract

Strategy is formally defined as a complete plan of action for every contingency in a game. Ideal agents can evaluate every contingency. But real people cannot do so, and require a belief-revision policy to guide their choices in unforeseen contingencies. The objects of belief-revision policies are beliefs, not strategies and acts. Thus, the rationality of belief-revision policies is subject to Bayesian epistemology. The components of any belief-revision policy are credences constrained by the probability axioms, by conditionalization, and by the principles of indifference and of regularity. The principle of indifference states that an agent updates his credences proportionally to the evidence, and no more. The principle of regularity states that an agent assigns contingent propositions a positive (but uncertain) credence. The result is rational constraints on real people’s credences that account for their uncertainty. Nonetheless, there is the open problem of non-evidential components that affect people’s credence distributions, despite the rational constraint on those credences. One non-evidential component is people’s temperaments, which affect people’s evaluation of evidence. The result is there might not be a proper recommendation of a strategy profile for a game (in terms of a solution concept), despite agents’ beliefs and corresponding acts being rational. View Full-Text
Keywords: backward induction; bayesian epistemology; belief-revision policy; epistemic game theory; evolutionary game theory; naturalistic game theory; strategy backward induction; bayesian epistemology; belief-revision policy; epistemic game theory; evolutionary game theory; naturalistic game theory; strategy
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This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. (CC BY 4.0).

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Sperry-Taylor, A.T. Strategy Constrained by Cognitive Limits, and the Rationality of Belief-Revision Policies. Games 2017, 8, 3.

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