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Games 2016, 7(4), 31; doi:10.3390/g7040031

Evolutionary Inspection and Corruption Games

1
Centre for Complexity Science, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
2
Department of Statistics, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
3
Institute of Informatics Problems of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IPI RAN), Vavilova, Moscow 119333, Russia
4
Risk Methodology, Santander UK plc, London NW1 3AN, UK
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Academic Editor: Ulrich Berger
Received: 9 June 2016 / Revised: 28 September 2016 / Accepted: 13 October 2016 / Published: 24 October 2016
View Full-Text   |   Download PDF [365 KB, uploaded 24 October 2016]   |  

Abstract

We extend a standard two-person, non-cooperative, non-zero sum, imperfect inspection game, considering a large population of interacting inspectees and a single inspector. Each inspectee adopts one strategy, within a finite/infinite bounded set of strategies returning increasingly illegal profits, including compliance. The inspectees may periodically update their strategies after randomly inter-comparing the obtained payoffs, setting their collective behaviour subject to evolutionary pressure. The inspector decides, at each update period, the optimum fraction of his/her renewable budget to invest on his/her interference with the inspectees’ collective effect. To deter the inspectees from violating, he/she assigns a fine to each illegal strategy. We formulate the game mathematically, study its dynamics and predict its evolution subject to two key controls, the inspection budget and the punishment fine. Introducing a simple linguistic twist, we also capture the corresponding version of a corruption game. View Full-Text
Keywords: inspection game; corruption game; evolutionary game; non-cooperative game; dynamic game; multiple inspectees; multiple violation levels; inspection budget; punishment fine inspection game; corruption game; evolutionary game; non-cooperative game; dynamic game; multiple inspectees; multiple violation levels; inspection budget; punishment fine
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This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. (CC BY 4.0).

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Katsikas, S.; Kolokoltsov, V.; Yang, W. Evolutionary Inspection and Corruption Games. Games 2016, 7, 31.

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