Leveraging Possibilistic Beliefs in Unrestricted Combinatorial Auctions
AbstractIn unrestricted combinatorial auctions, we put forward a mechanism that guarantees a meaningful revenue benchmark based on the possibilistic beliefs that the players have about each other’s valuations. In essence, the mechanism guarantees, within a factor of two, the maximum revenue that the “best informed player” would be sure to obtain if he/she were to sell the goods to his/her opponents via take-it-or-leave-it offers. Our mechanism is probabilistic and of an extensive form. It relies on a new solution concept, for analyzing extensive-form games of incomplete information, which assumes only mutual belief of rationality. Moreover, our mechanism enjoys several novel properties with respect to privacy, computation and collusion. View Full-Text
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Chen, J.; Micali, S. Leveraging Possibilistic Beliefs in Unrestricted Combinatorial Auctions. Games 2016, 7, 32.
Chen J, Micali S. Leveraging Possibilistic Beliefs in Unrestricted Combinatorial Auctions. Games. 2016; 7(4):32.Chicago/Turabian Style
Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio. 2016. "Leveraging Possibilistic Beliefs in Unrestricted Combinatorial Auctions." Games 7, no. 4: 32.
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