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Games 2013, 4(1), 50-65; doi:10.3390/g4010050

Tacit Collusion under Fairness and Reciprocity

1 and 2,*
Received: 25 September 2012 / Revised: 28 January 2013 / Accepted: 29 January 2013 / Published: 7 February 2013
Download PDF [261 KB, uploaded 7 February 2013]
Abstract: This paper departs from the standard profit-maximizing model of firm behavior by assuming that firms are motivated in part by personal animosity–or respect–towards their competitors. A reciprocal firm responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions (negative reciprocity), while at the same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind actions (positive reciprocity). We find that collusion is easier to sustain when firms have a concern for reciprocity towards competing firms provided that they consider collusive prices to be kind and punishment prices to be unkind. Thus, reciprocity concerns among firms can have adverse welfare consequences for consumers.
Keywords: fairness; reciprocity; collusion; repeated games fairness; reciprocity; collusion; repeated games
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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MDPI and ACS Style

İriş, D.; Santos-Pinto, L. Tacit Collusion under Fairness and Reciprocity. Games 2013, 4, 50-65.

AMA Style

İriş D, Santos-Pinto L. Tacit Collusion under Fairness and Reciprocity. Games. 2013; 4(1):50-65.

Chicago/Turabian Style

İriş, Doruk; Santos-Pinto, Luís. 2013. "Tacit Collusion under Fairness and Reciprocity." Games 4, no. 1: 50-65.

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