Games 2013, 4(1), 38-49; doi:10.3390/g4010038
Article

Nash Implementation in an Allocation Problem with Single-Dipped Preferences

1 National Institute of Statistics and Applied Economics, Madinat Al Irfane, Rabat Institutes, 10100 Rabat, Morocco 2 University of Caen, Center for Research in Economics and Management(UMR CNRS 6211), 19 Rue Claude Bloch 14032 Caen, Cedex, France
Received: 25 November 2012; in revised form: 10 January 2013 / Accepted: 15 January 2013 / Published: 30 January 2013
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Abstract: In this paper, we study the Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences. We show that, with at least three agents, Maskin monotonicity is necessary and sufficient for implementation. We examine the implementability of various social choice correspondences (SCCs) in this environment, and prove that some well-known SCCs are Maskin monotonic ( but they do not satisfy no-veto power) and hence Nash implementable.
Keywords: Nash implementation; allocation problem; single-dipped preferences

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MDPI and ACS Style

Doghmi, A. Nash Implementation in an Allocation Problem with Single-Dipped Preferences. Games 2013, 4, 38-49.

AMA Style

Doghmi A. Nash Implementation in an Allocation Problem with Single-Dipped Preferences. Games. 2013; 4(1):38-49.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Doghmi, Ahmed. 2013. "Nash Implementation in an Allocation Problem with Single-Dipped Preferences." Games 4, no. 1: 38-49.

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