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Games 2011, 2(3), 277-301; doi:10.3390/g2030277

Voluntary versus Enforced Team Effort

Faculty of Economic Sciences, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Platz der Göttinger Sieben 3, Göttingen D-37073, Germany
CIRANO and University of Montréal, 2020 University Street, Montréal, H3A 2A5 Canada
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 21 June 2011 / Revised: 3 August 2011 / Accepted: 8 August 2011 / Published: 19 August 2011
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We present a model where each of two players chooses between remuneration based on either private or team effort. Although at least one of the players has the equilibrium strategy to choose private remuneration, we frequently observe both players to choose team remuneration in a series of laboratory experiments. This allows for high cooperation payoffs but also provides individual free-riding incentives. Due to significant cooperation, we observe that, in team remuneration, participants make higher profits than in private remuneration. We also observe that, when participants are not given the option of private remuneration, they cooperate significantly less.
Keywords: team effort; voluntary collaboration; experimental economics team effort; voluntary collaboration; experimental economics
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0).

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MDPI and ACS Style

Keser, C.; Montmarquette, C. Voluntary versus Enforced Team Effort. Games 2011, 2, 277-301.

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