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Games 2011, 2(3), 235-256; doi:10.3390/g2030235
Article

The Existence of Perfect Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games

Department of Economics, Rutgers University, 75 Hamilton Street, New Brunswick, NJ 08901, USA
Received: 18 February 2011 / Revised: 27 April 2011 / Accepted: 27 June 2011 / Published: 15 July 2011
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Abstract

We prove the existence of a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium within a class of compact, metric, and possibly discontinuous games. Our conditions for existence are easily verified in a variety of economic games.
Keywords: trembling-hand perfect equilibrium; discontinuous game; infinite normal-form game; payoff security trembling-hand perfect equilibrium; discontinuous game; infinite normal-form game; payoff security
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0).
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Carbonell-Nicolau, O. The Existence of Perfect Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games. Games 2011, 2, 235-256.

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