Games 2010, 1(3), 242-261; doi:10.3390/g1030242
Article

Coordination Games on Dynamical Networks

Marco Tomassiniemail and Enea Pestelacci* email
Information Systems Institute, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 8 June 2010; in revised form: 7 July 2010 / Accepted: 28 July 2010 / Published: 29 July 2010
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Networks and Network Formation)
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Abstract: We propose a model in which agents of a population interacting according to a network of contacts play games of coordination with each other and can also dynamically break and redirect links to neighbors if they are unsatisfied. As a result, there is co-evolution of strategies in the population and of the graph that represents the network of contacts. We apply the model to the class of pure and general coordination games. For pure coordination games, the networks co-evolve towards the polarization of different strategies. In the case of general coordination games our results show that the possibility of refusing neighbors and choosing different partners increases the success rate of the Pareto-dominant equilibrium.
Keywords: evolutionary game theory; coordination games; games on dynamical networks; co-evolution

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Cite This Article

MDPI and ACS Style

Tomassini, M.; Pestelacci, E. Coordination Games on Dynamical Networks. Games 2010, 1, 242-261.

AMA Style

Tomassini M, Pestelacci E. Coordination Games on Dynamical Networks. Games. 2010; 1(3):242-261.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Tomassini, Marco; Pestelacci, Enea. 2010. "Coordination Games on Dynamical Networks." Games 1, no. 3: 242-261.

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