Open AccessThis article is
- freely available
Coordination Games on Dynamical Networks
Information Systems Institute, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 8 June 2010; in revised form: 7 July 2010 / Accepted: 28 July 2010 / Published: 29 July 2010
Abstract: We propose a model in which agents of a population interacting according to a network of contacts play games of coordination with each other and can also dynamically break and redirect links to neighbors if they are unsatisfied. As a result, there is co-evolution of strategies in the population and of the graph that represents the network of contacts. We apply the model to the class of pure and general coordination games. For pure coordination games, the networks co-evolve towards the polarization of different strategies. In the case of general coordination games our results show that the possibility of refusing neighbors and choosing different partners increases the success rate of the Pareto-dominant equilibrium.
Keywords: evolutionary game theory; coordination games; games on dynamical networks; co-evolution
Citations to this Article
Cite This Article
MDPI and ACS Style
Tomassini, M.; Pestelacci, E. Coordination Games on Dynamical Networks. Games 2010, 1, 242-261.
Tomassini M, Pestelacci E. Coordination Games on Dynamical Networks. Games. 2010; 1(3):242-261.
Tomassini, Marco; Pestelacci, Enea. 2010. "Coordination Games on Dynamical Networks." Games 1, no. 3: 242-261.