Games 2010, 1(3), 226-241; doi:10.3390/g1030226
Article

A Characterization of Farsightedly Stable Networks

1email, 2,3email and 3,* email
Received: 4 June 2010; in revised form: 7 July 2010 / Accepted: 16 July 2010 / Published: 22 July 2010
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Networks and Network Formation)
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Abstract: We study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted. We first provide an algorithm that characterizes the unique pairwise and groupwise farsightedly stable set of networks under the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule. We then show that this set coincides with the unique groupwise myopically stable set of networks but not with the unique pairwise myopically stable set of networks. We conclude that, if groupwise deviations are allowed then whether players are farsighted or myopic does not matter; if players are farsighted then whether players are allowed to deviate in pairs only or in groups does not matter.
Keywords: farsighted players; pairwise deviations; groupwise deviations
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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MDPI and ACS Style

Grandjean, G.; Mauleon, A.; Vannetelbosch, V. A Characterization of Farsightedly Stable Networks. Games 2010, 1, 226-241.

AMA Style

Grandjean G, Mauleon A, Vannetelbosch V. A Characterization of Farsightedly Stable Networks. Games. 2010; 1(3):226-241.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Grandjean, Gilles; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent. 2010. "A Characterization of Farsightedly Stable Networks." Games 1, no. 3: 226-241.

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