Open AccessThis article is
- freely available
A Characterization of Farsightedly Stable Networks
CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, 34 voie du Roman Pays, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
FNRS and CEREC, Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis, 43 Boulevard du Jardin Botanique, 1000 Brussels, Belgium
FNRS and CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, 34 voie du Roman Pays, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 4 June 2010; in revised form: 7 July 2010 / Accepted: 16 July 2010 / Published: 22 July 2010
Abstract: We study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted. We first provide an algorithm that characterizes the unique pairwise and groupwise farsightedly stable set of networks under the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule. We then show that this set coincides with the unique groupwise myopically stable set of networks but not with the unique pairwise myopically stable set of networks. We conclude that, if groupwise deviations are allowed then whether players are farsighted or myopic does not matter; if players are farsighted then whether players are allowed to deviate in pairs only or in groups does not matter.
Keywords: farsighted players; pairwise deviations; groupwise deviations
Article StatisticsClick here to load and display the download statistics.
Notes: Multiple requests from the same IP address are counted as one view.
Cite This Article
MDPI and ACS Style
Grandjean, G.; Mauleon, A.; Vannetelbosch, V. A Characterization of Farsightedly Stable Networks. Games 2010, 1, 226-241.
Grandjean G, Mauleon A, Vannetelbosch V. A Characterization of Farsightedly Stable Networks. Games. 2010; 1(3):226-241.
Grandjean, Gilles; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent. 2010. "A Characterization of Farsightedly Stable Networks." Games 1, no. 3: 226-241.