Game Analysis and Simulation of the River Basin Sustainable Development Strategy Integrating Water Emission Trading
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Review
2.1. Research Related Background
2.2. Theoretical Approach Selection
2.3. Approach Related Background
3. Evolutionary Game Analysis
3.1. Modeling
3.2. Results and Discussion
Equilibrium Points | Det J and Tr J | PM | Results |
---|---|---|---|
E1(0,0) | + | ESS | |
− | |||
E2(0,1) | + | instable | |
+ | |||
E3(1,1) | + | ESS | |
− | |||
E4(1,0) | + | instable | |
+ | |||
− | Saddle Point | ||
TrJ = 0 | 0 |
4. System Dynamics Simulation
4.1. Modeling and Parameter Design
- - Proportion of Population A choosing strategy
- - Proportion of Population B choosing strategy
- - Proportion of Population A choosing strategy, i.e.,
- - Proportion of Population B choosing strategy, i.e.,
- - The rate of changing with time
- - The rate of changing with time
- - Bidding related cost (unit: SC, “simulation currency”, without real meaning)
- - Price (unit: SC, “simulation currency”, without real meaning)
- - Penalty (unit: SC, “simulation currency”, without real meaning)
- - Perceived value of Population A (unit: SC, “simulation currency”, without real meaning)
- - Perceived value of Population B (unit: SC, “simulation currency”, without real meaning)
- - Initial value of
- - Initial value of
4.2. Preliminary Simulation Analysis
4.2.1. The Effect of on Rate of Convergence
Number | p | q | VA | VB | G | F | rH |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
4.2.1-1 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.2 | 0.1 | 0 |
4.2.1-2 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.2 | 0.1 | 0.2 |
4.2.1-3 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.2 | 0.1 | 0.3 |
4.2.2. The Effect of on Rate of Convergence
Number | p | q | VA | VB | G | F | rH |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
4.2.2-1 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.2 | 0.1 | 0.2 |
4.2.2-2 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.3 | 0.1 | 0.2 |
4.2.2-3 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.4 | 0.1 | 0.2 |
4.2.3. The Effect of on Rate of Convergence
Number | p | q | VA | VB | G | F | rH |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
4.2.3-1 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.3 | 0 | 0.2 |
4.2.3-2 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.3 | 0.1 | 0.2 |
4.2.3-3 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
4.3. Advanced Simulation Analysis
4.3.1. Test of Combined Effect of , and
Number | p | q | VA | VB | G | F | rH |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
4.3.1-1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.2 | 0.1 | 0.2 |
4.3.1-2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.2 | 0.14 | 0.1 |
4.3.1-3 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.16 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
4.3.2. Discussion of
Number | p | q | VA | VB | G | F | rH |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
4.3.2-1 | 0.35 | 0.1 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.2 | 0.1 | 0.2 |
4.3.2-2 | 0.35 | 0.1 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.16 | 0.1 | 0.2 |
4.3.2-3 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.16 | 0.1 | 0.2 |
4.3.3 Discussion on Saddle Point
Number | p | q | VA | VB | G | F | rH |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
4.2.1-1 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.2 | 0.1 | 0 |
4.3.3-1 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.2 | 0.1 | 0 |
4.3.3-2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.2 | 0.1 | 0 |
5. Conclusions
Acknowledgments
Author Contributions
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Liu, L.; Feng, C.; Zhang, H.; Zhang, X. Game Analysis and Simulation of the River Basin Sustainable Development Strategy Integrating Water Emission Trading. Sustainability 2015, 7, 4952-4972. https://doi.org/10.3390/su7054952
Liu L, Feng C, Zhang H, Zhang X. Game Analysis and Simulation of the River Basin Sustainable Development Strategy Integrating Water Emission Trading. Sustainability. 2015; 7(5):4952-4972. https://doi.org/10.3390/su7054952
Chicago/Turabian StyleLiu, Liang, Cong Feng, Hongwei Zhang, and Xuehua Zhang. 2015. "Game Analysis and Simulation of the River Basin Sustainable Development Strategy Integrating Water Emission Trading" Sustainability 7, no. 5: 4952-4972. https://doi.org/10.3390/su7054952