Taking this into consideration, we present next a proposal of a process view of psychosocial barriers and constraints on pro-ecological behavior. This will be based on an adaptation of the DN-Work model [
11] to integrate variables found in other models in the literature, and present a process approach of the processes that are expected to occur in their influence over pro-ecological behaviors. The approach will focus on two core processes in this regard: (1) the interaction between dispositional and situational variables that work as antecedents—distal variables—of the barriers and constraints emergence – proximal variables (as identified by Gardner and Stern [
6,
24]); and (2) the interaction between different classes of psychosocial barriers and constraints identified in the literature, namely the perceived and the unconscious barriers and constraints. A representation of this approach can be observed in the
Figure 1 below, in which the limiting factors include not only the factors of a non-psychological nature identified in the literature (see
Table 1) but also psychological factors associated with a set of dispositional and situational characteristics. Thus, this also includes the barriers identified by Gifford [
8]. The perceived barriers/constraints and the unconscious barriers/constraints categories include the corresponding categories found in the literature and identified in
Table 1 as negative determinants. This approach does not consider, however, the “lack of positive determinants” category, as these do not fit the definition of barriers/constraints presented here. A more developed explanation will be given next.
4.1. Limiting Factors as Antecedents of Barriers and Constraints
Gardner and Stern [
6,
24] identified “limiting factors” as internal and external psychological and non-psychological factors which prevent people from acting based on their pro-ecological attitudes. These can have either a more proximal or distal effect over behavior, depending on this effect being direct or mediated by other factors respectively. In order to allow for a better understanding of these differential effects, these will be viewed in accordance to Gaspar
et al. [
11]. Thus, differently from Gardner and Stern [
6,
24] who considered that the limiting factors could have either a distal or proximal effect; the “limiting factors” referred in this paper will be considered distal, while the barriers/constraints will be considered conceptually separated from these and defined as proximal. This is because the latter are psychological in nature while the former may or may not, be psychological.
Following from this, the limiting factors refer here to the antecedents of barriers and constraints, which result from an interaction between situational and dispositional characteristics, which may or may not lead to the emergence of barriers/constraints. Situational characteristics include the factors identified in
Table 1 as non-psychological, namely physical factors related with urban planning, architectural and design features for example and other non-physical factors such as economical, socio-demographic and others. Therefore, this category includes factors identified by Gardner and Stern [
6,
24], Gaspar
et al. [
11], Kollmuss and Agyeman [
9] and Tanner [
10]). In addition, psychological factors corresponding to situational characteristics, can also be included, namely factors/variables related to the social context in which the individuals find themselves in (e.g., number of individuals behaving in a certain way; Kaiser and Keller [
25]; Klöckner and Matties [
26]). Dispositional characteristics can also be included in this category, thus representing general tendencies, motivations, values, world views, attitudes and other types of individual traits/states (e.g., altruism) and mental representations of the self and the world around it (e.g., beliefs with regard to technology, economy, nature,
etc.). These dispositional characteristics can include some of the barriers identified by Gifford [
8], such as for example “limited cognition” or “ideologies”, which refer to variables that have a more distal effect over behavior, as they relate to a general cognitive functioning or worldviews, respectively. Differently from the (perceived and unconscious) barriers and constraints, which are behavioral and goal specific, these are general and unspecific characteristics (distal causes of behavior). Thus, they can also be considered antecedents of barriers and constraints that, in turn, have an influence over specific pro or anti-ecological goals and behaviors.
This interaction between dispositional and situational characteristics can be understood through a set of fundamental axioms of social psychology identified by Smith and Mackie [
32]. These axioms imply that we are the “builders” of our own reality,
i.e., each of us constructs our own world(s). Also, this construction is socially shared,
i.e., we can influence and be influenced by others, to achieve agreement in how reality is perceived. This is guided by cognitive and motivational processes, which determine how we collect, analyze and interpret the information we receive, in order to mentally organize it and achieve meaning. On one side, motivational guiding principles imply that: (1) people strive for mastery—they aim to understand the world and predict what happens, in order to get rewards (e.g., through perceived behavioral control, to achieve physical and mental well-being); (2) people seek connectedness—they desire to be accepted and supported by other people (e.g., through social support); (3) people value “me” and “mine”—they wish to be seen and the people whom they like, in a positive way (e.g., through social comparison). On another side the cognitive guiding principles imply: (1) conservatism—our views are slow to change and tend to maintain themselves (e.g., has shown in the difficulty in changing habits); (2) accessibility—the information that is most mentally accessible/available, has the highest probability of influencing our thoughts, emotions and behavior (e.g., a recent nuclear accident in another country may strongly influence our decisions to buy a house in our own country, next to a similar facility); (3) superficiality
vs. depth—although people can process the information they receive from the world around them in a systematic and effortful way (with depth), often they do this in a simple and superficial way (heuristic processing), with low effort.
Based on these principles, it can be seen that some of the barriers mentioned by Gifford [
8] can be considered characteristics of how human beings process the information and thus, reflect Smith and Mackie’s [
32] principles. The “Limited Cognition” category and specifically the “ancient brain” and “environmental numbness” for example, are associated with a more effortless and superficial processing of the information. The category “Limited Behavior” and specifically “tokenism” is associated with people’s conservatism and difficulty in changing their views and behaviors. On the other hand, the category “Comparison with Others” and specifically “social comparison” and “perceived inequity”; and the “conflicting values, goals and aspirations” from the “Sunk Costs” category, are all related with the motivational principles referred. Based on this view, some barriers identified by Gifford set the conditions for other barriers to emerge and influence behaviors. Thus, they should be separated from other types of barriers/constraints and included in the category of limiting factors, functioning as antecedents of these.
In addition to this, it seems logical that certain aspects of a situation might induce people to perceive them as limiting factors, while for other people that might not be the case. On the other hand, certain dispositional characteristics (e.g., personal skills) might be a limiting factor in some contexts if absent, while in others might not be. This means that certain dispositions and situations might not be a limitation across contexts and people. Moreover, rather than having an effect separately, the limitations result from their interaction (see e.g., [
9]). This interaction demands, on one hand, that the context (physical, social, economic,
etc.) functions as a cue/prompt to the activation of a set of individual characteristics and mental representations. This
cuing effect has been shown in the psychology literature to occur either with people being (conscious effect) or not being aware of this (unconscious effect). Examples include the activation of stereotypes, person impressions, attitudes, social norms, goals, personality traits and habitual behaviors (see e.g., [
33]). On the other hand, this interaction implies that, despite many of these processes occurring outside people’s awareness, people still need to give attention to them, namely
selective attention to the relevant contextual and internal cues/stimuli [
16]. In agreement, much research has shown that peoples’ characteristics, such as current goals and motivations for example can determine this selective attention. One example was given by Linderberg and Steg ([
18], p.119) with regard to the normative goal “to act appropriately”: “when such a goal is activated (
i.e., when it is the “focal” goal, or, as it is called here, a “goal frame”), it will influence what people think of at the moment, what information they are sensitive to, what action alternatives they perceive, and how they will act”.
One demonstration of this interaction between dispositional and situational variables was given by Kortenkamp and Moore [
34]. In a study of ethical reasoning about environmental dilemmas they explored the influence of ecocentric, anthropocentric and non-environmental orientations over this, based on both individual and situational variables. With regard to dispositional features, they showed that a pro-environmental attitude was positively correlated with both anthropocentric and ecocentric reasoning (and not just with ecocentric, as initially hypothesized), but not with non-environmental reasoning. Concerning situational features, they showed that presenting an environmental dilemma in which the environmental impacts were made salient also induced anthropocentric and ecocentric reasoning but not non-environmental reasoning. Moreover, emphasizing a land-use conflict (environmental impact on a pristine land
vs. a degraded land) in those dilemmas induced ecocentric reasoning while emphasizing a social conflict (grazing the land alone
vs. with others) induced less ecocentric reasoning and more non-environmental reasoning. In the author’s view, this implies that salient social issues (namely social conflict) moves people’s focus away from land issues thus implying a less ecocentric reasoning and vice-versa. In view of that, the authors concluded that “both individual differences and situational factors influence the type of moral reasoning an individual may bring to bear on a tragedy of the commons” ([
34], p.269).
Implied in the example from Kortenkamp and Moore [
34] is that non-environmental reasoning can work as a constraint to the implementation of pro-ecological goals and as a facilitator of anti or non-environmental behavioral goals. In this sense, it fits in the categories of subjective constraints (Tanner [
10]), internal barriers (Gardner and Stern [
6,
24]), internal factors (Kolmuss and Agyeman [
9]) and of perceived barriers/constraints (Gaspar
et al. [
11]). This is because people may be consciously aware of this being a negative determinant (barrier) of their behavior, given the level of deliberation/reasoning involved. In this regard, the interaction between attitudes and situational features functions as an antecedent/limiting factor and determines the type of reasoning followed.
Nevertheless, it is not completely clear from this, which aspects of the interaction between the situation and the individual are conscious and which are unconscious. This was the focus of Biel and Thøghersen’s [
13] literature review on social norms activation in social dilemmas: situations involving a choice between an individualistic (competitive) action and a collective (cooperative) action with regard to the use of resources (environmental, financial,
etc.). According to them, norm activation in social dilemma situations - e.g., the norm to compete, which would work as a barrier or constraint - can be determined both by individual and situational factors. With regard to the former, norms can be activated based on personal values, internalized by individuals. Thus, there can be individual variations in norm activation, with some individuals not behaving cooperatively because they do not feel consciously obliged to do it. Moreover, they might have an individualistic or competitive orientation—pro-self rather than pro-social—that might induce the activation of a norm to compete [
13].
The processes involved and the choices made are not necessarily conscious. They can be associated with the unconscious activation of individual achievement and goals to achieve power or status, based on situational cues [
35]. In addition, not only the context can prompt individual’s goals but also the individual characteristics can inhibit norm activation. This implies preventing individuals from focusing on contextual cues or deviating their attention to other situation features. In accordance, Biel and Thøghersen write that “Cooperation norms are
not activated if the individual fails to notice a need, or its relevance to his or her moral values, or effective action that he or she can master”. Thus, with regard to norm activation, need salience for example, seems to be relevant [
13], thus making clear the role of environmental cues in personal and social norms activation. In accordance, situational cues are important because when faced with a certain situation, individuals will search for these cues in order to assess and interpret the situation they are in. The behavior of others, for example, may influence the behavior an individual chooses to have. For example, seeing people contribute to a common resource increases the probability that an individual also contributes in that situation [
13], while the lack of contribution might imply less individual contribution. In addition to the social features of the situation, norm activation can also be determined by structural and non-structural aspects or the non-psychological limiting factors. Accordingly, framing the situation as economic
vs. non-economic implies a higher probability of activating an implicit norm of self-interest in the former, than in the latter [
13]. Given the presence of unconscious components in norm activation, these variables fit in the categories of ipsative constraints (Tanner [
10]) and unconscious barriers/constraints (Gaspar
et al. [
11]), as people may not be conscious of these processes taking place and influencing their behavior. These in turn are determined by limiting factors (psychological and non-psychological) resulting from both individual and situational variables.
Although the examples given referred to antecedents of barriers/constraints, they can also function as post-justifications and rationalizations of behaviors. The former refers to when people are consciously aware that these factors are not the cause of their behavior but use them to justify it (e.g., attributing their increase in energy consumption to the weather when they are aware that this is not the cause of their behavior). The latter refers to rationalizations, which occur when people misattribute the causes of their behaviors,
i.e., attributing a cause that might not be the “real” cause of their behavior. An example would be identifying low spatial accessibility of recycling facilities, as a justification for not disposing the waste in there and placing it in the undifferentiated waste facilities, closer to home. In this situation, the barrier could be a high mental effort involved in the separation of the different materials, which could function as behavioral constraint. These rationalizations might occur because people have limited introspective access to the causes and processes that guide their behaviors [
16], thus attributing them to “visible” causes. Although people may be aware of their justifications not being accurate, the same is not the case for rationalizations, in which people may believe that the causes they attribute to having acted in a certain way are “real” causes. In this sense, the latter functions as a barrier/constraint that may only be overcome by increasing people’s competence in assessing their own actions and associated causes (higher competence in introspection). This is something worth being considered in future research, namely the role of factors and variables presented in this paper and by other authors, either as antecedents or as post-justifications/rationalizations of behaviors, or both. In addition, it should also be acknowledged that not all situational characteristics have an influence over behaviors, mediated by psychological processes. In fact, some argue that this can occur through a more direct path, as for example is the influence that the exterior temperature has on domestic energy consumption levels [
36]. This is however a discussion open to epistemological and interdisciplinary debates, which go beyond the goals of this paper.
4.2. Psychosocial Barriers and Constraints: An Example
Drawing on the understanding of how the dispositional and situational characteristics interact and function as antecedents, it is important to present an example of this, based on the
Figure 2 below.
Figure 2.
Example of processes and factors that determine the psychosocial barriers and constraints.
Figure 2.
Example of processes and factors that determine the psychosocial barriers and constraints.
This example draws on Corral-Verdugo and Frías-Armenta’s [
37] study and corresponding results, with regard to domestic water usage behaviors. Based on this example, the situation refers to the neighborhood and associated social environment. This situation includes the water spending behaviors of others, that the individual observes (e.g., watching a neighbor watering the front lawn or washing the car)—and/or infers to occur (e.g., private domestic behaviors such as taking a shower). Moreover, given that in large-scale social dilemmas (e.g., pollution) “resources are less visible and environmental uncertainty is likely to play a larger role” ([
13], p.106), the situational factors may also imply resource uncertainty [
22]. Differently, the dispositional characteristics could include general motivations based on the activation of gain [
18] and/or pro-self [
13] goals and anti or non-environmental attitudes [
38]. These are just a few examples, given that other situational and dispositional factors could also have an influence.
The interaction between these factors could, on one side, elicit a perceived behavioral constraint such as a belief that water is an abundant resource [
37] and unrealistic optimism [
21] in this regard. On the other side, it could elicit the unconscious activation both of a social norm to compete for the resource [
13] and of a personal habit of water spending (see e.g., [
24] for a related example). The explicit beliefs could work as a constraint by interfering with the pro-ecological goal to save water and facilitating the anti-ecological goal of spending as much water as one needs. Differently, both the implicit norm and the habit can be strong enough to work as barriers and thus, inhibit the pro-ecological goal, rather than just interfering with it. Apart from these, other perceived and unconscious barriers and constraints could be present, thus increasing the magnitude of the effect over goals activation and operation. Other examples include variables from the discredence, ideologies and sunk costs categories identified by Gifford [
8], which can be seen as having their effect as barriers/constraints, rather than as their antecedents (as in the case of “limited cognition”).
Another important aspect to consider is that the perceived and the unconscious barriers/constraints can also interact and influence one another. An example of this refers to the cognitive inaccessibility of pro-ecological/cooperative behavioral options [
22] identified by Tanner [
10] as an ipsative constraint. This can not only function as an unconscious barrier but can also reinforce the general perception of behavioral barriers existence,
i.e., people can perceive that there are no alternatives to their behavior or that are constraints to this. Consequently, there can be a higher perceived difficulty in performing an alternative behavior. At the same time, the perceived barriers/constraints can also have an effect over the unconscious ones, as the reduced accessibility of pro-ecological behavioral alternatives, can increase the cognitive accessibility of the anti-ecological options that may also be perceived as easier to implement. This interaction is hypothesized to occur, given that, to our knowledge, there are no studies assessing it. This reflects a general gap in the literature, with regard to the study of barriers and constraints to pro-ecological behaviors. This is worrisome, as these factors and the processes involved may have many implications for behavior change and maintenance and consequently for projects and policies in this regard.