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Algorithms 2017, 10(3), 104; https://doi.org/10.3390/a10030104

Contract-Based Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsourcing Networks

1
Hubei Collaborative Innovation Center for High-efficiency Utilization of Solar Energy, Hubei University of Technology, Wuhan 430068, China
2
Hubei Key Laboratory for High-efficiency Utilization of Solar Energy and Operation Control of Energy Storage System, Hubei University of Technology, Wuhan 430068, China
3
Hubei Power Grid Intelligent Control and Equipment Engineering Technology Research Center, Hubei University of Technology, Wuhan 430068, China
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 26 July 2017 / Revised: 21 August 2017 / Accepted: 2 September 2017 / Published: 4 September 2017
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Abstract

Mobile crowdsourcing networks (MCNs) are a promising method of data collecting and processing by leveraging the mobile devices’ sensing and computing capabilities. However, because of the selfish characteristics of the service provider (SP) and mobile users (MUs), crowdsourcing participants only aim to maximize their own benefits. This paper investigates the incentive mechanism between the above two parties to create mutual benefits. By modeling MCNs as a labor market, a contract-based crowdsourcing model with moral hazard is proposed under the asymmetric information scenario. In order to incentivize the potential MUs to participate in crowdsourcing tasks, the optimization problem is formulated to maximize the SP’s utility by jointly examining the crowdsourcing participants’ risk preferences. The impact of crowdsourcing participants’ attitudes of risks on the incentive mechanism has been studied analytically and experimentally. Numerical simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed contract design scheme for the crowdsourcing incentive. View Full-Text
Keywords: mobile crowdsourcing; incentive mechanism; contract theory; risk preference mobile crowdsourcing; incentive mechanism; contract theory; risk preference
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Zhao, N.; Fan, M.; Tian, C.; Fan, P. Contract-Based Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsourcing Networks. Algorithms 2017, 10, 104.

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