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Sensors 2012, 12(6), 7994-8012; doi:10.3390/s120607994
Article

Compiler Optimizations as a Countermeasure against Side-Channel Analysis in MSP430-Based Devices

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Escuela Técnica Superior de Ingenieros de Telecomunicación, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, 28040 Madrid, Spain
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 16 May 2012 / Revised: 4 June 2012 / Accepted: 4 June 2012 / Published: 8 June 2012
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Abstract

Ambient Intelligence (AmI) requires devices everywhere, dynamic and massively distributed networks of low-cost nodes that, among other data, manage private information or control restricted operations. MSP430, a 16-bit microcontroller, is used in WSN platforms, as the TelosB. Physical access to devices cannot be restricted, so attackers consider them a target of their malicious attacks in order to obtain access to the network. Side-channel analysis (SCA) easily exploits leakages from the execution of encryption algorithms that are dependent on critical data to guess the key value. In this paper we present an evaluation framework that facilitates the analysis of the effects of compiler and backend optimizations on the resistance against statistical SCA. We propose an optimization-based software countermeasure that can be used in current low-cost devices to radically increase resistance against statistical SCA, analyzed with the new framework.
Keywords: embedded system security; side-channel attacks; hiding countermeasure; compiler optimization; MSP430 embedded system security; side-channel attacks; hiding countermeasure; compiler optimization; MSP430
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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Malagón, P.; de Goyeneche, J.-M.; Zapater, M.; Moya, J.M.; Banković, Z. Compiler Optimizations as a Countermeasure against Side-Channel Analysis in MSP430-Based Devices. Sensors 2012, 12, 7994-8012.

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