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Entropy 2018, 20(4), 286; doi:10.3390/e20040286

A Co-Opetitive Automated Negotiation Model for Vertical Allied Enterprises Teams and Stakeholders

1,2,3
,
1,2
,
1,2,* , 1,2
and
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1
College of Information Science and Engineering, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110819, China
2
State Key Laboratory of Synthetical Automation for Process Industries, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110819, China
3
School of Management, Heilongjiang University of Science and Technology, Harbin 150022, China
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 18 February 2018 / Revised: 2 April 2018 / Accepted: 11 April 2018 / Published: 14 April 2018
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Information Theory in Game Theory)
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Abstract

Upstream and downstream of supply chain enterprises often form a tactic vertical alliance to enhance their operational efficiency and maintain their competitive edges in the market. Hence, it is critical for an alliance to collaborate over their internal resources and resolve the profit conflicts among members, so that the functionality required by stakeholders can be fulfilled. As an effective solution, automated negotiation for the vertical allied enterprises team and stakeholder will sufficiently make use of emerging team advantages and significantly reduce the profit conflicts in teams with grouping decisions rather than unilateral decisions by some leader. In this paper, an automated negotiation model is designed to describe both the collaborative game process among the team members and the competitive negotiation process between the allied team and the stakeholder. Considering the co-competitiveness of the vertical allied team, the designed model helps the team members making decision for their own sake, and the team counter-offers for the ongoing negotiation are generated with non-cooperative game process, where the profit derived from negotiation result is distributed with Shapley value method according to contribution or importance contributed by each team member. Finally, a case study is given to testify the effectiveness of the designed model. View Full-Text
Keywords: vertical allied enterprises team; automated negotiation; non-cooperative game; Shapley value; supply chain; co-opetition vertical allied enterprises team; automated negotiation; non-cooperative game; Shapley value; supply chain; co-opetition
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Gao, T.; Wang, Q.; Huang, M.; Wang, X.; Zhang, Y. A Co-Opetitive Automated Negotiation Model for Vertical Allied Enterprises Teams and Stakeholders. Entropy 2018, 20, 286.

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