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Information 2018, 9(4), 87; https://doi.org/10.3390/info9040087

Auction-Based Cloud Service Pricing and Penalty with Availability on Demand

1,2,* and 1,3
1
School of Information Management and Engineering, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200433, China
2
School of Information Engineering, Huzhou University, Huzhou 313000, China
3
Institute of Fintech, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200433, China
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 19 March 2018 / Revised: 6 April 2018 / Accepted: 9 April 2018 / Published: 11 April 2018
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Abstract

Availability is one of the main concerns of cloud users, and cloud providers always try to provide higher availability to improve user satisfaction. However, higher availability results in higher provider costs and lower social welfare. In this paper, taking into account both the users’ valuation and desired availability, we design resource allocation, pricing and penalty mechanisms with availability on demand. Considering two scenarios: public availability in which the desired availabilities of all users are public information, and private availability in which the desired availabilities are private information of users, and, analyzing the possible behaviours of users, we design a truthful deterministic mechanism with 2-approximation in public availability scenario and a universal truthful mechanism with 1 1 + γ approximation in private availability scenario, where γ is the backup ratio of resources with the highest availability. The experiment results show that our mechanisms significantly improve the social welfare compared to the mechanism without considering availability demand of users. View Full-Text
Keywords: cloud computing; availability; auction mechanism; service credit cloud computing; availability; auction mechanism; service credit
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This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. (CC BY 4.0).
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Wu, X.; Han, J. Auction-Based Cloud Service Pricing and Penalty with Availability on Demand. Information 2018, 9, 87.

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