Cable Capacitance Attack against the KLJN Secure Key Exchange
AbstractThe security of the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-(like)-noise (KLJN) key exchange system is based on the fluctuation-dissipation theorem of classical statistical physics. Similarly to quantum key distribution, in practical situations, due to the non-idealities of the building elements, there is a small information leak, which can be mitigated by privacy amplification or other techniques so that unconditional (information-theoretic) security is preserved. In this paper, the industrial cable and circuit simulator LTSPICE is used to validate the information leak due to one of the non-idealities in KLJN, the parasitic (cable) capacitance. Simulation results show that privacy amplification and/or capacitor killer (capacitance compensation) arrangements can effectively eliminate the leak. View Full-Text
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Chen, H.-P.; Gonzalez, E.; Saez, Y.; Kish, L.B. Cable Capacitance Attack against the KLJN Secure Key Exchange. Information 2015, 6, 719-732.
Chen H-P, Gonzalez E, Saez Y, Kish LB. Cable Capacitance Attack against the KLJN Secure Key Exchange. Information. 2015; 6(4):719-732.Chicago/Turabian Style
Chen, Hsien-Pu; Gonzalez, Elias; Saez, Yessica; Kish, Laszlo B. 2015. "Cable Capacitance Attack against the KLJN Secure Key Exchange." Information 6, no. 4: 719-732.