This article is
- freely available
Information Pluralism and Some Informative Modes of Ignorance
IAMSR, Abo Akademi University, Joukahaisgatan 3-5A, 20520 Abo, Finland
Received: 11 November 2010 / Accepted: 11 January 2011 / Published: 17 January 2011
Abstract: In this paper information concepts will be roughly divided into two categories: The cybernetic and the semiotic-pragmatic. They are further divided into three and four subcategories, respectively. The cybernetic conception of information, which comprises both the mathematical-statistic and the logical-semantic approaches, misses some aspects of information and knowing, that are important in economics and technology studies, among others. The semiotic-pragmatic approach presumes the existence of several modes of being of information, as well as connects certainty and ambiguity to information in a different way from how the cybernetic approach does. These two general approaches to information and knowing are strikingly different, especially in their analysis of ignorance or incomplete knowledge. None of the cybernetic conceptions, and only some conceptions within the semiotic-pragmatic approach, can vindicate the elusive intuition of the potential positive role of ignorance. This comparative, philosophical discussion of the modes of ignorance may be taken as a challenge for cybernetics and computational philosophy to make better sense of incomplete knowledge.
Keywords: ignorance; information; ecological rationality; abduction; bounded rationality; heuristics; cybernetics
Article StatisticsClick here to load and display the download statistics.
Notes: Multiple requests from the same IP address are counted as one view.
Cite This Article
MDPI and ACS Style
Patokorpi, E. Information Pluralism and Some Informative Modes of Ignorance. Information 2011, 2, 41-60.
Patokorpi E. Information Pluralism and Some Informative Modes of Ignorance. Information. 2011; 2(1):41-60.
Patokorpi, Erkki. 2011. "Information Pluralism and Some Informative Modes of Ignorance." Information 2, no. 1: 41-60.