Transculturalism and the Meaning of Life
AbstractI begin by introducing the standoff between the transculturalist aim of moving beyond cultural inheritances, and the worry that this project is itself a product of cultural inheritances. I argue that this is rooted in concerns about the meaning of life, and in particular, the prospect of nihilism. I then distinguish two diametrically opposed humanistic responses to nihilism, post-Nietzschean rejections of objective truth, and the moral objectivism favoured by some analytic philosophers, claiming that both attempt, in different ways, to break down the distinction between description and evaluation. I argue that the evaluative sense of a “meaningful life” favoured by moral objectivists cannot track objective meaningfulness in human lives, and that there are manifest dangers to treating social meaning judgements as a secular substitute for the meaning of life. I then conclude that the problems of the post-Nietzscheans and moral objectivists can be avoided, and the transculturalist standoff alleviated, if we recognise that nihilism is descriptive, and maintain a principled distinction between description and evaluation. View Full-Text
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Tartaglia, J. Transculturalism and the Meaning of Life. Humanities 2016, 5, 25.
Tartaglia J. Transculturalism and the Meaning of Life. Humanities. 2016; 5(2):25.Chicago/Turabian Style
Tartaglia, James. 2016. "Transculturalism and the Meaning of Life." Humanities 5, no. 2: 25.
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