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Humanities 2013, 2(3), 351-368; doi:10.3390/h2030351

Rorty, Williams, and Davidson: Skepticism and Metaepistemology

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School of Philosophy, Psychology & Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh, Dugald Stewart Building, Charles Street, Edinburgh, EH8 9AD, UK
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 12 June 2013 / Revised: 21 June 2013 / Accepted: 25 June 2013 / Published: 8 July 2013
(This article belongs to the Special Issue The Legacy of Richard Rorty)
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We revisit an important exchange on the problem of radical skepticism between Richard Rorty and Michael Williams. In his contribution to this exchange, Rorty defended the kind of transcendental approach to radical skepticism that is offered by Donald Davidson, in contrast to Williams’s Wittgenstein-inspired view. It is argued that the key to evaluating this debate is to understand the particular conception of the radical skeptical problem that is offered in influential work by Barry Stroud, a conception of the skeptical problem which generates metaepistemological ramifications for anti-skeptical theories. In particular, we argue that, contra Williams, Rorty’s view that Davidson was offering a theoretical diagnosis of radical skepticism can be consistently maintained with his transcendental approach.
Keywords: transcendental arguments; radical skepticism; metaepistemological skepticism; theoretical diagnosis; Barry Stroud transcendental arguments; radical skepticism; metaepistemological skepticism; theoretical diagnosis; Barry Stroud
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY) which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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Pritchard, D.; Ranalli, C. Rorty, Williams, and Davidson: Skepticism and Metaepistemology. Humanities 2013, 2, 351-368.

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