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Rorty, Williams, and Davidson: Skepticism and Metaepistemology
School of Philosophy, Psychology & Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh, Dugald Stewart Building, Charles Street, Edinburgh, EH8 9AD, UK
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Received: 12 June 2013; in revised form: 21 June 2013 / Accepted: 25 June 2013 / Published: 8 July 2013
Abstract: We revisit an important exchange on the problem of radical skepticism between Richard Rorty and Michael Williams. In his contribution to this exchange, Rorty defended the kind of transcendental approach to radical skepticism that is offered by Donald Davidson, in contrast to Williams’s Wittgenstein-inspired view. It is argued that the key to evaluating this debate is to understand the particular conception of the radical skeptical problem that is offered in influential work by Barry Stroud, a conception of the skeptical problem which generates metaepistemological ramifications for anti-skeptical theories. In particular, we argue that, contra Williams, Rorty’s view that Davidson was offering a theoretical diagnosis of radical skepticism can be consistently maintained with his transcendental approach.
Keywords: transcendental arguments; radical skepticism; metaepistemological skepticism; theoretical diagnosis; Barry Stroud
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Pritchard, D.; Ranalli, C. Rorty, Williams, and Davidson: Skepticism and Metaepistemology. Humanities 2013, 2, 351-368.
Pritchard D, Ranalli C. Rorty, Williams, and Davidson: Skepticism and Metaepistemology. Humanities. 2013; 2(3):351-368.
Pritchard, Duncan; Ranalli, Christopher. 2013. "Rorty, Williams, and Davidson: Skepticism and Metaepistemology." Humanities 2, no. 3: 351-368.