Open AccessThis article is
- freely available
Reconsidering Richard Rorty’s Private-Public Distinction
Department of Political Science, School of Public Policy, University College London, 29/30 Tavistock Square, London WC1H 9QU, UK
Received: 25 March 2013; in revised form: 2 May 2013 / Accepted: 8 May 2013 / Published: 13 May 2013
Abstract: This article provides a new interpretation of Richard Rorty’s notion of the private-public distinction. The first section of the article provides a short theoretical overview of the origins of the public-private distinction in Rorty’s political thought and clarifies the Rortian terminology. The main portion of the article is dedicated to the critique of Rorty’s private-public distinction, divided into two thematic sections: (i) the private-public distinction as undesirable and (ii) the private-public distinction as unattainable. I argue that Rorty’s formulation provides plausible answers to the first kind of criticism, but not to the second. Finally, a reformulation of the private-public distinction will be suggested, which both mitigates the second line of criticism and better coheres with Rorty’s general theory.
Keywords: Rorty; Richard; pragmatism and neo-pragmatism; public-private distinction; liberalism
Citations to this Article
Cite This Article
MDPI and ACS Style
Erez, L. Reconsidering Richard Rorty’s Private-Public Distinction. Humanities 2013, 2, 193-208.
Erez L. Reconsidering Richard Rorty’s Private-Public Distinction. Humanities. 2013; 2(2):193-208.
Erez, Lior. 2013. "Reconsidering Richard Rorty’s Private-Public Distinction." Humanities 2, no. 2: 193-208.