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Symmetry 2011, 3(3), 680-698; doi:10.3390/sym3030680
Symmetry and Evidential Support
Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin–Madison, 600 North Park Street, Madison, WI 53706, USA
Received: 27 April 2011; in revised form: 25 August 2011 / Accepted: 30 August 2011 / Published: 16 September 2011
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Symmetry in Probability and Inference)
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Abstract: This article proves that formal theories of evidential favoring must fail because they are inevitably language dependent. I begin by describing Carnap’s early confirmation theories to show how language dependence problems (like Goodman’s grue problem) arise. I then generalize to showthat any formal favoring theory satisfying minimal plausible conditions will yield different judgments about the same evidence and hypothesis when they are expressed in alternate languages. This does not just indict formal theories of favoring; it also shows that something beyond our evidence must be invoked to substantively favor one hypothesis over another.
Keywords: evidence; evidential support; Carnap; grue; language dependence
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MDPI and ACS Style
Titelbaum, M.G. Symmetry and Evidential Support. Symmetry 2011, 3, 680-698.AMA Style
Titelbaum MG. Symmetry and Evidential Support. Symmetry. 2011; 3(3):680-698.Chicago/Turabian Style
Titelbaum, Michael G. 2011. "Symmetry and Evidential Support." Symmetry 3, no. 3: 680-698.