The Effects of Land Reallocation on Irrigation Collective Action: Moderating Effects of Informal Organizations and Leadership

Abstract

The prevailing literature has extensively explored the economic ramifications of land reallocation; however, its impact on commons governance remains underexamined. This study, using the agricultural irrigation system in rural China as an example, empirically investigated how land reallocation affects collective action. Survey information from 6298 households, spread across 461 villages in 20 Chinese provinces, served as the basis for the analysis. Our findings suggest that land reallocation is unfavorable for irrigation collective action, but the presence of informal organizations and effective leadership within the village can help ameliorate these negative effects. This research contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of the nexus between land reallocation and irrigation collective action, offering potentially valuable policy insights for countries or regions worldwide that grapple with land reallocation issues.

1. Introduction

The core issue in the governance of the commons is the need to resolve the collective-action dilemma represented by the “Tragedy of the Commons,” where individual rationality diverges from collective rationality [1]. Over the past half-century, scholars have conducted extensive research on this issue, summarizing the appropriation dilemma and the provision dilemma as the two main problems in the governance of the commons. The appropriation dilemma fundamentally deals with the allocation of usage rights for the infrastructure. Conversely, the provision dilemma essentially involves the challenge of equitable cost distribution within the collective for the construction and maintenance of infrastructure. It typically emerges when users inadequately invest in resource-system maintenance or overexploit resources, leading to resource-system degradation and potentially incapacitating effective provisions [2]. The issues of “overexploitation” and “free-riding” are well-known challenges in the context of collective-action dilemmas. To comprehensively tackle these dilemmas, the academic community has conducted extensive analyses to understand their underlying causes. A significant finding, highlighted by Olson, is that collective-action dilemmas often arise due to the large size of the group, which increases the temptation for individuals to engage in free-riding behavior [1]. To address these dilemmas, an effective approach is to establish robust governance mechanisms for managing public affairs, as emphasized by Ostrom (1990), thereby promoting self-governance as a viable solution [3].

Irrigation commons exemplifies a case closely related to the collective-action dilemma. As water flows through the canals, it is easy for farmers to “free-ride” during irrigation water usage. At the same time, for farmers located upstream in the canal, water access is more convenient, reducing their incentive to repair irrigation facilities. The irrigation commons is a classic problem in the study of international commons governance. Scholars have effectively demonstrated a way to solve the above-mentioned challenges through a Nepalese case study. This investigation highlighted that irrigation systems managed by farmers typically surpass those managed by agencies in terms of performance. This underscores the significance of collective-action capabilities in irrigation commons [4].

Nevertheless, the collective-action capability in rural China is not promising. The current research has identified that various facets of China’s agricultural and rural development are encountering the hurdle of dwindling collective-action capabilities, culminating in a crisis of rural Chinese commons governance. To reverse the continuous decline of collective-action capabilities in China’s rural areas, many scholars have conducted research from a root-cause perspective, identifying socioeconomic factors such as labor out-migration [5] and land fragmentation [6] as having negative impacts on irrigation collective action in China. However, these studies have largely neglected the impact of elements within China’s land system, such as land reallocation, on irrigation collective action.

The rural land structure in China is founded upon the household responsibility system, wherein the village holds collective ownership over the land while farmers retain the rights to contract land. Initially, the allocation of contracted arable land per household was proportionate to the number of family members. Over time, changes in household population have resulted in some families having many members but little land and others having few members but a lot of land, leading to an imbalance in the distribution of people to land. This discrepancy has instigated conflicts and contradictions in certain villages. To maintain the initial state of egalitarian distribution, some villages initiate land reallocation every few years. As previously mentioned, surveys reveal that in the course of the second round of land contracting, 63.7% of villages underwent land reallocation, and even after this second round, 34.6% of villages continued to undergo land reallocation [7]. Relevant research from the viewpoint of agricultural economics has proven that land reallocation impedes farmers’ formation of long-term expectations and curtails their sustained investment in land and irrigation resources [8]. Yet, these studies have overlooked the repercussions of land reallocation on collective action.

This research aims to enrich the understanding of the interplay and underlying mechanisms of land reallocation and collective action, specifically in the context of irrigation systems. This endeavor advances the current body of knowledge in three significant ways. First, the research innovatively conducts interdisciplinary research on land reallocation in the fields of economics and commons governance, analyzes the consequences of land reallocation from a commons governance perspective, and provides a valuable supplement to existing research on land reallocation and collective action. Second, this research scrutinizes the role of informal organizations and leadership, assessing how these elements moderate the influence of land reallocation on irrigation collective action. The insights gleaned from this analysis can serve as a theoretical guide for policymaking at a higher level. Lastly, our study harnesses an extensive empirical dataset from a broad sample survey encompassing 461 villages and 6298 households across 20 provinces in China. The empirical analysis of the impact and mechanisms of land reallocation on irrigation collective action, rooted in a Chinese context, not only validates our findings but also offers practical insights applicable to land-system configurations and village-commons governance in other global contexts.

In the subsequent portion of this paper, we will propose our research hypotheses. Section 3 will delve into the methodological approach employed in this study, encompassing aspects such as data acquisition, model selection, and variable identification. Section 4 will present the results derived from the econometric analysis, followed by a comprehensive discussion. Section 5 will provide further discussion of the research findings. Finally, in Section 6, we will summarize the conclusions of this paper and elaborate on its theoretical and practical value.

2. Research Hypotheses and Analytical Framework

A considerable amount of research has confirmed that under the collective property rights system of rural land in China, land reallocation may reduce farmers’ long-term operational expectations [9]; this instability in land rights acts as a sort of random tax [10] and may even lead agricultural operators to adopt predatory operations for short-term profits [11]. However, these studies have not considered the impact of land reallocation on irrigation collective action in villages. Does land reallocation not only negatively impact agricultural economic development but also hinder the governance of the commons in villages? Furthermore, has China discovered a strategy to overcome the provision dilemma? Surrounding these two key questions, we will further elaborate on the research hypotheses of this paper.

2.1. Direct Impact Analysis of Land Reallocation on Collective Action

Despite the dearth of comprehensive studies examining the effects of land reallocation on irrigation collective action in villages, existing research suggests that unstable land tenure can potentially impair the governance of village commons. This can manifest in forms such as frequent free-riding behavior and a decline in farmer involvement and investment in communal activities [12,13]. This is particularly evident in the context of agricultural irrigation facilities, where the establishment demands widespread farmer participation [14]. Frequent land reallocation, however, might dampen farmers’ willingness to commit to long-term participation and investment in collective irrigation actions [15]. Consequently, we put forth the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1 (H1).

Land reallocation has adverse effects on irrigation collective action.

2.2. Analysis of Moderating Effects Based on Informal Organizations

A mere direct examination of whether land reallocation affects irrigation collective action falls short of a comprehensive understanding. Institutions are the foundation of the commons and even the decisive factor of it. The research indicates that informal institutions bear significant weight in governance. Institutions, including customs, norms, and ethical foundations established through prolonged interaction among group members, can help curtail opportunistic behavior [16], and when villages form good self-governance rules, it will greatly improve village commons performance [17].

From the 1980s to the 1990s, the village self-governance system was the most important governance system in rural China. The village committee was the most important organizational form, and the villagers’ congress was the most important form of democratic participation and collective choice mechanisms. In the early 21st century, especially after 2005, China allocated public finances to initiatives such as the New Rural Construction and the improvement of rural living environments. As a result, informal organizations, such as villagers’ councils, began to emerge in China, stimulated by these public financial investments. These organizations aimed to tackle the challenges confronted by the self-governance system in rural areas, which struggled to operate effectively or impose functional constraints. Partial surveys show that in Zigui County, Hubei Province, after the establishment of informal organizations such as villagers’ councils, the number of villagers participating in governance increased, the workload of village cadres decreased, and the commons governance significantly improved [16]. In addition, due to the relatively small size of the villagers’ council, it has resolved the problems of having a large scale, a wide area, and a large number of out-migrant farmers. These problems can make it difficult to convene villagers’ congress. It is more conducive to collective decision-making and the conduct of village commons. Taking Chengdu City, Sichuan Province, as an example, the council is composed of village cadres, village representatives, and local worthies. The council membership ranges between 20 and 50 individuals, a size that fosters deliberation and the establishment of collective action [18]. Based on this, this study believes that villages that have long-established informal organizations, such as villagers’ councils, have relatively better grassroots democracy and are more conducive to collective action in the village. Therefore, we propose Hypothesis 2.

Hypothesis 2 (H2).

Informal organizations exert a favorable moderating influence on the impact of land reallocation on irrigation collective action; that is, these informal organizations help alleviate the adverse impact of land reallocation on irrigation collective action.

2.3. Analysis of Moderating Effects Based on Leadership

In addition to the “institutional perspective,” this study will further analyze the moderating effect of leadership based on the “action perspective”.

Leadership has always been regarded as the key to commons governance [19,20]. Good leaders can use their power advantages [21], opportunity awareness, social skills, and knowledge of public leadership to resolve conflicts within the group [22] and then develop a sense of commitment and consciousness to jointly solve difficulties [23]. On the one hand, leaders play an important role in establishing goals, coordinating supervision, resolving disputes, or implementing rewards and punishments [22]. When the farmers are unwilling to participate in village commons, the introduction of a capable leader can solve the organization, supervision, and sanction issues of collective action [24]. Successful leaders can persuade community members to voluntarily contribute to the commons in the village [25]. When the group has a low identity and lacks trust, relatively tough and autocratic leaders can promote collective action by solving initial transaction-cost issues without relying on mutual trust among collaborators [26]. On the other hand, the leadership of village cadres can indirectly affect village collective action through villagers’ sense of belonging. Successful leaders share group characteristics, norms, and values and better encourage members to voluntarily contribute [24]. By cultivating a sense of belonging, capable leaders can facilitate the alignment of individual interests with collective interests, promoting cooperation and collective action [27]. For example, Meinzen-Dick tested the positive role of good, insightful, and influential leaders in collective action using data from Indian canal irrigation organizations [28]. Therefore, we propose Hypothesis 3.

Hypothesis 3 (H3).

Leadership plays a pivotal role in moderating collective action; that is, effective leadership helps alleviate the adverse impact of land reallocation on irrigation collective action.

In summary, based on the analysis and summary of the literature, we roughly form the understanding that land reallocation is detrimental to irrigation collective action, but informal organizations and leadership can help mitigate these adverse effects. Furthermore, this paper incorporates land reallocation, informal organizations, leadership, and irrigation collective action into a unified analytical framework. In addition to land reallocation, other variables also affect collective action. This paper organizes these variables based on the institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework, constructing the analytical framework for this paper (Figure 1). The IAD framework is an important theoretical framework used for analyzing collective action and commons governance [29]. It has been widely used and extended in research [30]. In the traditional IAD framework, the left side consists of three sets of exogenous variables, namely community attributes, physical attributes, and institutional attributes. The middle section represents the action arena, which includes the elements of action situations and actors. The right side represents the interactions, outcomes, and evaluation criteria. In this study, we concentrate on how exogenous generic institutional rules (i.e., land reallocation) influence the outcome (i.e., the irrigation collective action). Furthermore, we also analyze whether it is possible to induce changes in outcomes through informal organizations (such as villagers’ councils) and actors (such as village cadre leadership) within the IAD framework.

3. Data, Model, and Variables

3.1. Data Source

The data utilized in our research were gathered in 2017 by the Chinese Institute for Rural Studies at Tsinghua University. The information collection encompassed both village-level and household-level questionnaires. Village questionnaires were primarily filled out by the village cadre, while household-level questionnaires were administered via interviews with randomly selected household heads conducted by research assistants. The specific research methodology was as follows. First, researchers identified 40–50 villages in each province that represented varying degrees of economic development. Subsequently, the team leader engaged a village cadre in each village to fill out the village-level questionnaire during an interview. Lastly, the remaining research assistants randomly chose 15–25 farmers to complete the household-level questionnaires through individual interviews. Our research data were obtained by strictly matching the village and household questionnaires, ultimately using data from 20 provinces, 461 villages, and 6298 households as the representative sample for this study.

3.2. Model

According to the research hypothesis of this paper, land reallocation affects irrigation collective action. First, this research sets the baseline model as follows:

$$Y_i={\alpha }_0+{\beta }_1{lr}_i+\sum {\gamma }_i{Z}_i+{\epsilon }_i$$

(1)

In Equation (1), ${\mathit{Y}}_{\mathit{i}}$ represents the irrigation collective action; ${\mathit{l}\mathit{r}}_{\mathit{i}}$ is land reallocation; ${\mathit{Z}}_{\mathit{i}}$ stands for control variables; ${\mathit{\alpha }}_0$ is the constant term, ${\mathit{\beta }}_1$ and ${\mathit{\gamma }}_{\mathit{i}}$ are coefficients that are to be estimated, and ${\mathit{\epsilon }}_{\mathit{i}}$ is the error term.

Moreover, to scrutinize the impact mechanism of land reallocation on collective action, we introduce the interaction terms “land reallocation × leadership” and “land reallocation × informal organizations.” We hypothesize that leadership and informal organizations play a moderating role in the process of land reallocation, affecting irrigation collective action and contributing to mitigating the main effect. To validate the aforementioned moderating mechanisms, we construct the following moderation-effect model:

$${\mathit{Y}}_{\mathit{i}}={\mathit{\alpha }}_0+{\mathit{\beta }}_1{\mathit{l}\mathit{r}}_{\mathit{i}}+{\mathit{\beta }}_2{\mathit{l}\mathit{s}}_{\mathit{i}}+{\mathit{\beta }}_3{\mathit{l}\mathit{r}}_{\mathit{i}}{\mathit{l}\mathit{s}}_{\mathit{i}}+\sum {\mathit{\gamma }}_{\mathit{i}}{\mathit{Z}}_{\mathit{i}}+{\mathit{\epsilon }}_{\mathit{i}}$$

(2)

$${\mathit{Y}}_{\mathit{i}}={\mathit{\alpha }}_0+{\mathit{\beta }}_1{\mathit{l}\mathit{r}}_{\mathit{i}}+{\mathit{\beta }}_4{\mathit{l}\mathit{t}}_{\mathit{i}}+{\mathit{\beta }}_5{\mathit{l}\mathit{r}}_{\mathit{i}}{\mathit{l}\mathit{s}}_{\mathit{i}}+\sum {\mathit{\gamma }}_{\mathit{i}}{\mathit{Z}}_{\mathit{i}}+{\mathit{\epsilon }}_{\mathit{i}}$$

(3)

where ${\mathit{Y}}_{\mathit{i}}$ and ${\mathit{l}\mathit{r}}_{\mathit{i}}$ still represent the irrigation collective action and land reallocation, respectively; ${\mathit{l}\mathit{s}}_{\mathit{i}}$ is the moderating variable representing leadership; ${\mathit{l}\mathit{t}}_{\mathit{i}}$ is the moderating variable representing informal organizations; ${\mathit{l}\mathit{r}}_{\mathit{i}}{\mathit{l}\mathit{s}}_{\mathit{i}}$ and ${\mathit{l}\mathit{r}}_{\mathit{i}}{\mathit{l}\mathit{t}}_{\mathit{i}}$ are the interaction terms; ${\mathit{Z}}_{\mathit{i}}$ represents control variables related to collective action in the commons.

3.3. Variable

3.3.1. Dependent Variables

Irrigation collective action. This paper mainly focuses on collective action represented by the conditions of farmland water conservancy and irrigation. The questionnaires also include measurements for commons, such as “access to roads” and “availability of medical facilities”. However, the primary reason for selecting water conservancy and irrigation is as follows: firstly, compared to commons such as highways, medical facilities, and education, the maintenance of irrigation facilities is more often determined autonomously by the villages, with less interference from higher-level governments; secondly, irrigation directly affects agricultural production and is one of the most important commons in rural areas. Based on this, this study chooses “the frequency of households participating in the construction and maintenance of irrigation facilities (1 = never–5 = very frequent)” as the dependent variable measuring collective action in the commons. Moreover, for the sake of robustness testing, this study will also select “the frequency of households participating in irrigation water use meetings (1 = never–5 = very frequent)” as an alternative dependent variable indicator.

3.3.2. Core Independent Variable

The core independent variable is land reallocation. The Central Document No. 1 of 1984, an annual document issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council, holds immense significance for rural work in China. It explicitly stipulated that the first round of contracting would last for 15 years from 1978. Commencing in 1993, the second round of land contracting has been ongoing. Therefore, the land reallocation referred to in this study pertains to whether land reallocation has occurred during the second contracting phase. In this context, the value 1 signifies that land reallocation transpired within the village throughout the second contracting round, whereas 0 denotes the absence of land reallocation.

3.3.3. Moderating Variables

In order to explore the impact of land reallocation on irrigation collective action within villages, we have identified leadership and informal organizations as moderating factors in this research, grounded in our theoretical analysis. These variables are anticipated to exert a moderating impact on the connection between land reallocation and collective action in the commons.

This study also examines the interplay of informal institutions, specifically focusing on the role played by entities such as the villagers’ council, assessed by “the presence or absence of a villagers’ council in the village”. The villagers’ council, distinct from the formal village self-governance system and the villagers’ committee, is informally constituted. However, in the process of establishment and operation, the villagers’ council references or follows the village self-governance system, demonstrating a strong sense of rules, proceduralism, and democracy. Therefore, we posit that informal organizations symbolized by the villagers’ council promote collective action and help mitigate the adverse effects caused by land reallocation. In this study, villages with a villagers’ council are assigned a value of 1, while those without are designated a 0.

Some researchers have found that under certain conditions, external actors in collective action can help overcome some of the pitfalls of the collective-action dilemma. For example, they can leverage their leadership to balance power conflicts within the organization, address trust issues, and encourage members to better adhere to internal rules [31,32]; they can also use their social capital to improve governance [33]. Therefore, this study selects leadership as a moderating variable. This indicator is derived from factor analysis and dimensionality reduction in variables related to the respondents’ evaluation of village cadres in the household survey, specifically covering phrases such as “their work efficiency is high”, “their organizational coordination ability is outstanding”, “they have contributed substantially to the village’s development”, and “their work achievements are widely recognized by villagers”. Higher leadership factor analysis scores indicate a higher evaluation of village cadres by villagers, and lower scores indicate a lower evaluation.

3.3.4. Control Variables

From the four dimensions of the IAD framework, we selected control variables that affect collective action. In terms of community attributes, we chose village scale, village development, and labor out-migration as three variables. In terms of physical attributes, we selected two variables: village topography and village water resources. For the institutional context, we used land transfer and water disputes as two variables. Regarding land transfer, the national average level of land use rights transfers in 2017 was 36.97%. Consequently, if a village’s land transfer rate surpasses the national average, it signifies that the village’s land transfer system is operating effectively. For household attributes, we used household population structure, household head’s education level, and age as three variables. Definitions of these variables and corresponding descriptive statistics can be found in

Table 1. Variable definitions and descriptive statistics.

Variable	Description and Definition	Mean	Std.	Min.	Max.
Dependent variables
Irrigation collective action (ICAI)	Frequency of household participation in irrigation-facility construction and maintenance: 1 = never, 2 = seldom, 3 = sometimes, 4 = often, 5 = usually	2.959	1.192	1	5
Irrigation collective action (ICAII)	Frequency of household participation in irrigation water meetings: 1 = never, 2 = seldom, 3 = sometimes, 4 = often, 5 = usually	2.932	1.152	1	5
Independent variables
Land reallocation	The village has undergone land reallocation after 1993: 1 = yes, 0 = no	0.655	0.476	0	1
Moderating Variables
Leadership	Factor analysis scores for the evaluation of village leaders	−0.079	0.989	−3.093	1.420
Informal organizations	Whether the village has established a villagers’ council: 1 = yes, 0 = no	0.203	0.402	0	1
Control variables
Community Attributes
Village size	Total number of households in a village(ln)	6.267	0.766	3.219	8.519
Village development	Net income per person in the village for 2016(ln)	8.858	0.631	5.521	10.597
Labor out-migration	Proportion of out-migrant laborers in the village labor force	0.242	0.349	0	0.965
Physical Attributes
Village topography	Geographical location with plain of the village: 1 = yes, 0 = no	0.470	0.499	0	1
Village water resources	Whether the village has moderate water scarcity: 1 = yes, 0 = no	0.081	0.273	0	1
Institutional Context
Land transfer	Village land transfer ratio exceeding 36.97%: 1 = yes, 0 = no	0.075	0.264	0	1
Water disputes	Frequency of water disputes perceived by farmers: 1 = never, 2 = seldom, 3 = sometimes, 4 = often, 5 = usually	1.426	0.857	1	5
Household Attributes
Household population structure	Proportion of labor force in the household.	0.724	0.272	0	1
Education	Educational attainment of the household head: 1 = absent from school, 2 = primary education, 3 = junior middle school education, 4 = high school education, 5 = university education, 6 = Postgraduate education	2.655	0.906	1	6
Age	Age of the household head	52.472	12.321	20	85

.

4. Empirical Analysis

4.1. Baseline Regression

To comprehensively examine whether land reallocation affects irrigation collective action, we utilized Stata 17.0 and adopted a stepwise regression method for testing.

Table 2. Baseline regression result of land reallocation on collective action.

Variables		Frequency of Participation in Construction and Maintenance of Collective Irrigation
		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Independent variables	Land reallocation	−0.083 *	−0.103 **	−0.108 **	−0.125 **	−0.134 ***
		(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.050)
Community attributes	Village size		0.061 **	0.070 **	0.060 *	0.071 **
			(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
	Village development		0.223 ***	0.202 ***	0.184 ***	0.180 ***
			(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.040)
	Labor out-migration		−0.174 ***	−0.166 ***	−0.184 ***	−0.221 ***
			(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.067)
Physical attributes	Village topography			0.064	0.042	0.035
				(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)
	Village water resources			−0.422 ***	−0.418 ***	−0.404 ***
				(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.086)
Institutional context	Land transfer				0.286 ***	0.321 ***
					(0.094)	(0.094)
	Water disputes				0.006	0.008
					(0.027)	(0.027)
Household attributes	Household population structure					0.411 ***
						(0.084)
	Education					0.024
						(0.028)
	Age					−0.007 ***
						(0.002)
	Sample	6298	6298	6298	6298	6298
	Chi2	3.1	47.2	74.7	84.0	112.6
	Pseudo R2	0.0002	0.0024	0.0039	0.0043	0.0063

Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

presents the baseline model regression results (the dependent variable is ICAI). In Table 2, Model 1 only includes the variable of land reallocation, Model 2 introduces the community-attributes variables, Model 3 integrates the physical-attributes variables, Model 4 encompasses the institutional-context variables, and Model 5 constitutes the complete model, encompassing land reallocation and the three sets of control variables.

The model outcomes reveal that land reallocation prevents irrigation collective action. Employing a stepwise regression method, Model 1 passed the significance test at the 10% level, Model 2 to Model 4 passed the significance test at the 5% level, Model 5 passed the significance test at the 1% level, and all the models exhibit negative coefficients, denoting robust findings. Our study concentrates on the empirical results of Model 5, which align with research Hypothesis 1, i.e., land reallocation exerts a negative impact on irrigation collective action (H1). This indicates that in villages with land reallocation, the irrigation collective action by households is inferior. Therefore, we can reject H0. At the same time, we conducted robustness tests by changing the dependent variable, using “frequency of household participation in irrigation water use meetings” as an indicator to measure irrigation collective action (

Table 3. Robustness test results of land reallocation on collective action.

Variables		Frequency of Participation in Irrigation Water Meetings
		Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Independent variables	Land reallocation	−0.055	−0.096 *	−0.086 *	−0.107 **	−0.118 **
		(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Control variables			YES	YES	YES	YES
	Sample	6298	6298	6298	6298	6298
	Chi2	1.3	116.3	150.16	165.8	200.4
	Pseudo R2	0.0001	0.0061	0.0079	0.0087	0.0105

Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

). Model 10 shows that the core independent variable “land reallocation” does not have a substantive change in sign, further verifying the robustness of the results.

Pertaining to the community attributes variables, the results of Model 5 and Model 10 demonstrate that both village scale and village development promote the frequency of household participation in irrigation-facility construction and maintenance. Specifically, when the village scale is larger, the participation frequency of households in the construction and upkeep of irrigation facilities exhibits an uptick. Furthermore, village development has passed the 1% significance level test, signifying that higher per capita income in the village correlates with increased enthusiasm among households to participate in irrigation-facility construction and maintenance. Additionally, labor out-migration hinders irrigation collective action, indicating that as the proportion of labor out-migration in villages increases, the ability of villages to engage in irrigation collective action will be weakened.

With respect to the variables under physical attributes, the presence or absence of plain topography does not significantly influence irrigation collective action. However, the status of village water resources deteriorates irrigation collective action. This implies that when village water resources are abundant, households are more likely to engage proactively in irrigation collective action. This may be because when village water resource conditions are poor, households will not be optimistic about the positive impact of public irrigation-facility construction and maintenance on their own farmland irrigation. They may also be more prone to resource disputes due to water shortages, leading to a greater water shortage and a lower frequency of household participation in irrigation-facility construction and maintenance.

As for the two variables of village-land-transfer ratio and water-use disputes in the institutional context, only the village-land-transfer ratio passed the significance test, showing a significant positive impact. This is because when the village-land-transfer ratio exceeds a certain proportion, it indicates that the village possesses a higher governance level, which in turn positively affects collective action.

Concerning the variables of household attributes, the effects of family structure and household head age on the dependent variable are significant, while the household head’s education level fails to pass the model’s significance test. Specifically, the structure of the family notably enhances the frequency of household involvement in the construction and maintenance of irrigation facilities. In other words, as the proportion of the family’s working-age population increases in relation to the overall family size, households exhibit a higher propensity to participate in irrigation collective actions. Additionally, the household head’s age has a notable negative influence on the frequency of household involvement in irrigation-facility construction and maintenance, implying that as the household head ages, their willingness to participate in collective irrigation activities tends to decrease.

4.2. Analysis of the Moderating Effect Based on Informal Organizations

The aforementioned baseline model outcomes conclusively reveal that land reallocation significantly diminishes irrigation collective action. As a result, it can be inferred that stabilizing land property rights is essential for enhancing collective action. This also meets the requirements of a series of policies and laws regarding land property-rights stabilization enacted by the Chinese government. Nonetheless, despite this, some surveys have discovered that land reallocation still exists in many villages in China, which is detrimental to collective action in the commons. Consequently, is it possible to identify other effective channels to resolve this conflict? Relevant research has determined that informal organizations, serving as a complement to formal institutions, play a crucial role in the governance of the commons. Consequently, this paper extends this line of inquiry by examining the moderating effect of informal organizations, specifically the villagers’ councils, on the relationship between land reallocation and collective actions surrounding village irrigation systems.

In

Table 4. Results of the moderating effect based on informal organizations.

Variables		Frequency of Participation in Construction and Maintenance of Collective Irrigation
		Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15
Independent variables	Land reallocation	−0.108 **	−0.129 **	−0.127 **	−0.149 ***	−0.154 ***
		(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)
	Informal organizations	0.157 ***	0.174 ***	0.165 ***	0.181 ***	0.155 ***
		(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.059)
Interaction	Land reallocation × informal organizations	0.502 ***	0.526 ***	0.518 ***	0.529 ***	0.491 ***
		(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.137)	(0.138)	(0.138)
Community attributes	Village size		0.069 **	0.075 **	0.063 **	0.074 **
			(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
	Village development		0.235 ***	0.217 ***	0.198 ***	0.194 ***
			(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.040)
	Labor out-migration		−0.152 **	−0.149 **	−0.166 **	−0.199 **
			(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.067)
Physical attributes	Village topography			0.025	0.000	−0.010
				(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.048)
	Village water resources			−0.419 ***	−0.421 ***	−0.410 ***
				(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.086)
Institutional context	Land transfer				0.312 ***	0.341 ***
					(0.094)	(0.094)
	Water disputes				0.025	0.022
					(0.027)	(0.027)
Household attributes	Household population structure					0.384 ***
						(0.085)
	Education					0.010
						(0.028)
	Age					−0.007 ***
						(0.002)
	Sample	6298	6298	6298	6298	6298
	Chi2	28.4	75.9	100.9	112.6	145.1
	Pseudo R2	0.0015	0.0039	0.0052	0.0058	0.0075

Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

and

Table 5. Robustness test results for the moderating effect based on informal organizations.

Variables		Frequency of Participation in Irrigation Water Meetings
		Model 16	Model 17	Model 18	Model 19	Model 20
Independent variables	Land reallocation	−0.108 **	−0.151 ***	−0.133 ***	−0.163 ***	−0.170 ***
		(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)
	Informal organizations	0.363 ***	0.391 ***	0.397 ***	0.421 ***	0.399 ***
		(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)
Interaction	Land reallocation × informal organizations	0.254 *	0.286 **	0.305 **	0.323 ***	0.283 **
		(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.134)
Control variables			YES	YES	YES	YES
	Sample	6298	6298	6298	6298	6298
	Chi2	50.0	172.7	207.1	228.8	254.9
	Pseudo R2	0.0026	0.0091	0.0109	0.0120	0.0134

Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

, this paper uses the cross term “land reallocation” and “villagers’ councils” to examine the informal organizations’ moderating effect on collective action. Table 4 and Table 5 represent the baseline regression results for the moderating effect and the results of the robustness test, respectively. Existing research has verified that villagers’ councils aid in enhancing rural commons’ performance [34]. The econometric results from models 11 to 20 reveal that land reallocation significantly diminishes village irrigation collective action, passing the significance test at the 1% and 5% levels. The informal organizations strongly promote collective action and are statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that the establishment of informal organizations such as the villagers’ council within a village significantly bolsters the degree of irrigation collective actions. More importantly, in models 11 to 15, the positive interaction term of land reallocation and informal organization passes the 1% significance level test, signifying that institutional rules can notably mitigate the adverse impact of land reallocation on irrigation collective actions. The test results corroborate Hypothesis H2 of this study.

4.3. Analysis of the Moderating Effect Based on Leadership

Building on the analysis of the moderating effect of the “institutional perspective”, we further introduce leadership as a moderating variable from the “actor perspective”.

Table 6. Results of the moderating effect based on leadership.

Variables		Frequency of Participation in Construction and Maintenance of Collective Irrigation
		Model 21	Model 22	Model 23	Model 24	Model 25
Independent variables	Land reallocation	−0.083 *	−0.086 *	−0.099 *	−0.110 **	−0.121 **
		(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)
	Leadership	0.417 ***	0.407 ***	0.411 ***	0.411 ***	0.412 ***
		(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Interaction	Land reallocation × leadership	0.141 ***	0.130 **	0.139 ***	0.135 ***	0.126 **
		(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Community attributes	Village size		0.072 **	0.086 ***	0.079 **	0.092 ***
			(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
	Village development		0.116 ***	0.090 **	0.083 **	0.082 **
			(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)
	Labor out-migration		−0.182 ***	−0.167 ***	−0.172 ***	−0.200 ***
			(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.067)
Physical attributes	Village topography			0.116 ***	0.109 **	0.105 **
				(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.048)
	Village water resources			−0.417 ***	−0.427 ***	−0.418 ***
				(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)
Institutional context	Land transfer				0.137	0.171 *
					(0.094)	(0.094)
	Water disputes				0.043	0.040
					(0.027)	(0.027)
Household attributes	Household population structure					0.395 ***
						(0.085)
	Education					−0.015
						(0.028)
	Age					−0.008 ***
						(0.002)
	Sample	6298	6298	6298	6298	6298
	Chi2	299.3	320.7	352.4	357.0	393.9
	Pseudo R2	0.0155	0.0166	0.0182	0.0185	0.0204

Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

and

Table 7. Robustness test results for the moderating effect based on leadership.

Variables		Frequency of Participation in Irrigation Water Meetings
		Model 26	Model 27	Model 28	Model 29	Model 30
Independent variables	Land reallocation	−0.056	−0.079	−0.075	−0.090 *	−0.104 **
		(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.050)
	Leadership	0.488 ***	0.467 ***	0.467 ***	0.466 ***	0.469 ***
		(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Interaction	Land reallocation × leadership	0.134 ***	0.115 **	0.122 **	0.115 **	0.107 **
		(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Control variables			YES	YES	YES	YES
	Sample	6298	6298	6298	6298	6298
	Chi2	402.3	473.4	507.0	514.8	550.8
	Pseudo R2	0.0211	0.0249	0.0266	0.0270	0.0289

Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

harness the intersection of “land reallocation” and “leadership,” scrutinizing the role of key players concerning the effects of land reallocation on collective action. The dependent variable in Table 6 signifies the rate of household engagement in building and preserving irrigation systems, whereas Table 7 serves as a robustness test; its dependent variable indicates the rate of household attendance in meetings about the use of irrigation water. Existing studies have demonstrated that the inspirational influence of village cadres is positively correlated with inclusive innovation in villagers’ collaborative behavior [35]. Additionally, the leadership of village cadres has been found to contribute to enhancing the performance of the commons [25]. The econometric outcomes from models 21 to 30 reveal that land reallocation seriously undermines irrigation collective action, reconfirming the adverse effect of land reallocation. Leadership significantly improves the irrigation collective action and passes the 1% significance level test, indicating that the stronger the leadership ability of village cadres, the higher the probability of farmers participating in irrigation collective action. More importantly, in models 21 to 30, the positive interaction term of land reallocation and leadership passes the 1% and 5% significance level test, signifying that leadership can notably relieve the negative impact of baseline regression results. The test results corroborate Hypothesis H3 of this study.

5. Discussion

The empirical results have validated the hypothesis that land reallocation deteriorates collective action. Specifically, when land is reallocated frequently in villages, there is a notable decrease in irrigation collective action. Potential explanations for this may include the following.

First, land reallocation exacerbates land fragmentation. Due to the principle of equal distribution of rural land in China based on population, land allocation needs to comprehensively consider factors such as family population size, land quality, plot size, and distance to achieve fairness, which leads to more severe land fragmentation. As the degree of land fragmentation escalates, farmers’ agricultural production costs increase, and the enthusiasm for collective action in villages diminishes.

Second, land reallocation may trigger conflicts and disputes among villagers. Variations in the population growth across households might result in differing perspectives towards land reallocation, with some farmers advocating for it while others remain opposed. This can provoke conflicts among villagers, making collective action in the village more difficult. Additionally, conflicts may arise between village officials and villagers. In some villages, households related to village officials may gain an advantage during the allocation process, which can further fuel dissatisfaction among villagers and hinder participation in collective action.

Third, land reallocation may reduce the enthusiasm of new agricultural operators to acquire land management rights. Due to cost–benefit considerations, these operators typically need to invest in the land after acquisition. However, when land reallocation occurs frequently, this may increase the risk of land production investment, leading new agricultural operators to prefer land with stable property rights. At the same time, these new operators may still be the primary force for maintaining and repairing village irrigation facilities. However, when land is frequently reallocated, villages may lose these new operating entities that serve as the primary force for maintaining the village’s irrigation facilities.

Of course, apart from the aforementioned explanations, there might be other reasons for the explanations. For instance, unstable land property rights could lead to frequent free-riding behavior among farmers, which is not conducive to collective action [36].

Although many factors can influence collective action in the commons, these factors are unlikely to reverse the negative effects of land reallocation. For instance, natural conditions in villages are relatively stable and difficult to change, and the socioeconomic factors of village leaders may also be constrained by natural conditions and hard to improve significantly. However, by comparison, informal organizations and exogenous leadership can both change the village commons’ performance and are relatively easy to achieve. As a result, addressing the negative effects of land reallocation on the village commons’ performance through informal organizations and leadership is a viable strategy.

6. Conclusions

For an extended period, the Chinese government has made efforts to stabilize rural land property rights; however, land reallocation has persisted in China. While many studies have explored the influence of land reallocation on agricultural investment from an agricultural economic development perspective, few scholars have studied this problem from the standpoint of commons governance. Our study examined the effect of land reallocation on collective action and discovered that land reallocation is unfavorable for irrigation collective action. However, informal organizations and leadership can help alleviate these adverse effects.

Our research has significant implications both academically and practically. On the one hand, our study extended the classic topic of land reallocation in agricultural economics to the field of commons governance, representing an innovative attempt that broadens the academic boundaries of land reallocation and village-commons governance. On the other hand, our research conclusions are not only applicable to China, which implements collective ownership of rural land, but also hold significant importance for countries facing property rights instability where land tenure belongs to individuals. From a global perspective, many countries undertake land reallocation to address the issue of fragmented land parcels. For example, in countries such as Turkey, where individual land ownership prevails [37], they also need to adjust the number, size, and location of farmers’ plots to achieve land consolidation [38]. This process of land reallocation, similar to the situation in China, directly leads to unstable property rights and can further trigger land-related disputes, as also seen in Nigeria [39]. Therefore, in a broader and more general sense, our research potentially has significant implications for global land institutional arrangements.

There are some inevitable limitations to this study. First, due to the constraints of the sample data, it is difficult for us to carry out more detailed research. For example, we can only use “whether the village has undergone land reallocation” to reflect the land reallocation situation in the village, but we cannot further analyze the impact of different land reallocation methods and frequencies on collective irrigation actions. Second, we currently find that informal organizations and leadership help mitigate the negative impact of land reallocation on irrigation collective action. In future research, it may be valuable to further explore the mechanisms of land reallocation to irrigation collective action.