Construction of Subgame-Perfect Mixed-Strategy Equilibria in Repeated Games
AbstractThis paper examines how to construct subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in discounted repeated games with perfect monitoring. We introduce a relatively simple class of strategy profiles that are easy to compute and may give rise to a large set of equilibrium payoffs. These sets are called self-supporting sets, since the set itself provides the continuation payoffs that are required to support the equilibrium strategies. Moreover, the corresponding strategies are simple as the players face the same augmented game on each round but they play different mixed actions after each realized pure-action profile. We find that certain payoffs can be obtained in equilibrium with much lower discount factor values compared to pure strategies. The theory and the concepts are illustrated in 2 × 2 games. View Full-Text
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Berg, K.; Schoenmakers, G. Construction of Subgame-Perfect Mixed-Strategy Equilibria in Repeated Games. Games 2017, 8, 47.
Berg K, Schoenmakers G. Construction of Subgame-Perfect Mixed-Strategy Equilibria in Repeated Games. Games. 2017; 8(4):47.Chicago/Turabian Style
Berg, Kimmo; Schoenmakers, Gijs. 2017. "Construction of Subgame-Perfect Mixed-Strategy Equilibria in Repeated Games." Games 8, no. 4: 47.
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