Structural Holes in Social Networks with Exogenous Cliques
AbstractIt has been empirically shown that structural holes in social networks enable potential large benefits to those individuals who bridge them (Burt, 2004). The work in Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007) shows that the large payoff differentials caused by structural holes can persist even when agents strategically add and remove ties to smooth those differentials, thereby providing a game-theoretic rationale for the existence of bridge-agents. The present paper ties back to the initial empirical literature by explicitly assuming that agents are exogenously linked forming cliques, as in a firm environment. In this setting, bridge-agents cannot be sustained under the same conditions of Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007). Instead, they can be sustained when the deviation possibilities are restricted and only when they connect small groups of agents to the rest. View Full-Text
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Rubí-Barceló, A. Structural Holes in Social Networks with Exogenous Cliques. Games 2017, 8, 32.
Rubí-Barceló A. Structural Holes in Social Networks with Exogenous Cliques. Games. 2017; 8(3):32.Chicago/Turabian Style
Rubí-Barceló, Antoni. 2017. "Structural Holes in Social Networks with Exogenous Cliques." Games 8, no. 3: 32.
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