Epistemically Robust Strategy Subsets
Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O. Box 1095 Blindern, NO-0317 Oslo, Norway
Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Box 6501, SE-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden
Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, 31000 Toulouse, France
Department of Mathematics, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, SE-100 44 Stockholm, Sweden
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Academic Editors: Paul Weirich and Ulrich Berger
Received: 31 August 2016 / Revised: 16 November 2016 / Accepted: 17 November 2016 / Published: 25 November 2016
We define a concept of epistemic robustness
in the context of an epistemic model of a finite normal-form game where a player type corresponds to a belief over the profiles of opponent strategies and types. A Cartesian product X
of pure-strategy subsets is epistemically robust if there is a Cartesian product Y
of player type subsets with X
as the associated set of best reply profiles such that the set
contains all player types that believe with sufficient probability that the others are of types in
and play best replies. This robustness concept provides epistemic foundations for set-valued generalizations of strict Nash equilibrium, applicable also to games without strict Nash equilibria. We relate our concept to closedness under rational behavior and thus to strategic stability and to the best reply property and thus to rationalizability.
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. (CC BY 4.0).
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MDPI and ACS Style
Asheim, G.B.; Voorneveld, M.; Weibull, J.W. Epistemically Robust Strategy Subsets. Games 2016, 7, 37.
Asheim GB, Voorneveld M, Weibull JW. Epistemically Robust Strategy Subsets. Games. 2016; 7(4):37.
Asheim, Geir B.; Voorneveld, Mark; Weibull, Jörgen W. 2016. "Epistemically Robust Strategy Subsets." Games 7, no. 4: 37.
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