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Games 2016, 7(2), 13; doi:10.3390/g7020013

The Role of Framing, Inequity and History in a Corruption Game: Some Experimental Evidence

Department of Economics, University of Auckland, 660 Owen G Glenn Building, 12 Grafton Road, Auckland 1142, New Zealand
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Academic Editor: Ulrich Berger
Received: 12 April 2016 / Revised: 8 June 2016 / Accepted: 14 June 2016 / Published: 22 June 2016
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Abstract

We investigate the role of framing, inequity in initial endowments and history in shaping behavior in a corrupt transaction by extending the one-shot bribery game introduced by Cameron et al. (2009) to a repeated game setting. We find that the use of loaded language significantly reduces the incidence of bribery and increases the level of punishment. Punishment of bribery leads to reduced bribery in future. The evidence suggests that this game captures essential features of a corrupt transaction, over and above any sentiments of inequity aversion or negative reciprocity However, showing subjects the history of past play has little effect on the level of corruption. View Full-Text
Keywords: corruption; experiments; bribes; punishment; framing corruption; experiments; bribes; punishment; framing
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. (CC BY 4.0).

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MDPI and ACS Style

Chaudhuri, A.; Paichayontvijit, T.; Sbai, E. The Role of Framing, Inequity and History in a Corruption Game: Some Experimental Evidence. Games 2016, 7, 13.

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