Evidential Equilibria: Heuristics and Biases in Static Games of Complete Information
AbstractStandard equilibrium concepts in game theory find it difficult to explain the empirical evidence from a large number of static games, including the prisoners’ dilemma game, the hawk-dove game, voting games, public goods games and oligopoly games. Under uncertainty about what others will do in one-shot games, evidence suggests that people often use evidential reasoning (ER), i.e., they assign diagnostic significance to their own actions in forming beliefs about the actions of other like-minded players. This is best viewed as a heuristic or bias relative to the standard approach. We provide a formal theoretical framework that incorporates ER into static games by proposing evidential games and the relevant solution concept: evidential equilibrium (EE). We derive the relation between a Nash equilibrium and an EE. We illustrate these concepts in the context of the prisoners’ dilemma game. View Full-Text
Scifeed alert for new publicationsNever miss any articles matching your research from any publisher
- Get alerts for new papers matching your research
- Find out the new papers from selected authors
- Updated daily for 49'000+ journals and 6000+ publishers
- Define your Scifeed now
al-Nowaihi, A.; Dhami, S. Evidential Equilibria: Heuristics and Biases in Static Games of Complete Information. Games 2015, 6, 637-676.
al-Nowaihi A, Dhami S. Evidential Equilibria: Heuristics and Biases in Static Games of Complete Information. Games. 2015; 6(4):637-676.Chicago/Turabian Style
al-Nowaihi, Ali; Dhami, Sanjit. 2015. "Evidential Equilibria: Heuristics and Biases in Static Games of Complete Information." Games 6, no. 4: 637-676.