Next Article in Journal
The Role of the Decision-Making Regime on Cooperation in a Workgroup Social Dilemma: An Examination of Cyberloafing
Previous Article in Journal
Risk Aversion and Engagement in the Sharing Economy
Previous Article in Special Issue
Cooperate without Looking in a Non-Repeated Game
Article Menu

Export Article

Open AccessArticle
Games 2015, 6(4), 574-587; doi:10.3390/g6040574

Commitment to Cooperation and Peer Punishment: Its Evolution

1
Faculty of Mathematics, University of Vienna, Vienna 1090, Austria
2
Department of Business Administration, Soka University, Tokyo 192-8577, Japan
3
Department of Information Systems and Operations, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Vienna 1020, Austria
4
Research Center, RINRI Institute, Tokyo 101-8385, Japan
5
School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Academic Editors: Martin A. Nowak and Christian Hilbe
Received: 17 September 2015 / Revised: 20 October 2015 / Accepted: 23 October 2015 / Published: 3 November 2015
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Cooperation, Trust, and Reciprocity)
View Full-Text   |   Download PDF [2427 KB, uploaded 3 November 2015]   |  

Abstract

Theoretical and empirical studies have generally weighed the effect of peer punishment and pool punishment for sanctioning free riders separately. However, these sanctioning mechanisms often pose a puzzling tradeoff between efficiency and stability in detecting and punishing free riders. Here, we combine the key aspects of these qualitatively different mechanisms in terms of evolutionary game theory. Based on the dilemmatic donation game, we introduce a strategy of commitment to both cooperation and peer punishment. To make the commitment credible, we assume that those willing to commit have to make a certain deposit. The deposit will be refunded as long as the committers faithfully cooperate in the donation game and punish free riders and non-committers. It turns out that the deposit-based commitment offers both the efficiency of peer punishment and the stability of pool punishment and that the replicator dynamics lead to transitions of different systems: pool punishment to commitment to peer punishment. View Full-Text
Keywords: evolution of cooperation; peer punishment; pool punishment; commitment; refundable deposit evolution of cooperation; peer punishment; pool punishment; commitment; refundable deposit
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. (CC BY 4.0).

Supplementary material

Scifeed alert for new publications

Never miss any articles matching your research from any publisher
  • Get alerts for new papers matching your research
  • Find out the new papers from selected authors
  • Updated daily for 49'000+ journals and 6000+ publishers
  • Define your Scifeed now

SciFeed Share & Cite This Article

MDPI and ACS Style

Sasaki, T.; Okada, I.; Uchida, S.; Chen, X. Commitment to Cooperation and Peer Punishment: Its Evolution. Games 2015, 6, 574-587.

Show more citation formats Show less citations formats

Related Articles

Article Metrics

Article Access Statistics

1

Comments

[Return to top]
Games EISSN 2073-4336 Published by MDPI AG, Basel, Switzerland RSS E-Mail Table of Contents Alert
Back to Top