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Games 2015, 6(3), 231-250; doi:10.3390/g6030231

The Evolvability of Cooperation under Local and Non-Local Mutations

Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
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Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Academic Editors: Martin A. Nowak and Christian Hilbe
Received: 23 May 2015 / Revised: 17 July 2015 / Accepted: 17 July 2015 / Published: 23 July 2015
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Cooperation, Trust, and Reciprocity)
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Abstract

We study evolutionary dynamics in a population of individuals engaged in pairwise social interactions, encoded as iterated games. We consider evolution within the space of memory-1strategies, and we characterize all evolutionary robust outcomes, as well as their tendency to evolve under the evolutionary dynamics of the system. When mutations are restricted to be local, as opposed to non-local, then a wider range of evolutionary robust outcomes tend to emerge, but mutual cooperation is more difficult to evolve. When we further allow heritable mutations to the player’s investment level in each cooperative interaction, then co-evolution leads to changes in the payoff structure of the game itself and to specific pairings of robust games and strategies in the population. We discuss the implications of these results in the context of the genetic architectures that encode how an individual expresses its strategy or investment. View Full-Text
Keywords: cooperation; evolvability; adaptive dynamics; iterated games; memory-1 strategies; payoff evolution; evolution of investment cooperation; evolvability; adaptive dynamics; iterated games; memory-1 strategies; payoff evolution; evolution of investment
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. (CC BY 4.0).

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Stewart, A.J.; Plotkin, J.B. The Evolvability of Cooperation under Local and Non-Local Mutations. Games 2015, 6, 231-250.

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