How Moral Codes Evolve in a Trust Game
AbstractThis paper analyzes the dynamic stability of moral codes in a two population trust game. Guided by a moral code, members of one population, the Trustors, are willing to punish members of the other population, the Trustees, who defect. Under replicator dynamics, adherence to the moral code has unstable oscillations around an interior Nash Equilibrium (NE), but under smoothed best response dynamics we obtain convergence to Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE). View Full-Text
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Rabanal, J.P.; Friedman, D. How Moral Codes Evolve in a Trust Game. Games 2015, 6, 150-160.
Rabanal JP, Friedman D. How Moral Codes Evolve in a Trust Game. Games. 2015; 6(2):150-160.Chicago/Turabian Style
Rabanal, Jean P.; Friedman, Daniel. 2015. "How Moral Codes Evolve in a Trust Game." Games 6, no. 2: 150-160.