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Games 2013, 4(3), 497-507; doi:10.3390/g4030497
Short Note

Speech Is Silver, Silence Is Golden

1,*  and 2
Received: 13 June 2013; in revised form: 16 August 2013 / Accepted: 22 August 2013 / Published: 30 August 2013
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Abstract: This paper experimentally investigates free-riding behavior on communication cost in a coordination game and finds strong indications of such free-riding. Firstly, the subjects wait for others to send a message when communication is costly, which does not happen when communication is costless. Secondly, the proportion of games where no communication or one-way communication takes place is much higher when communication is costly compared to when it is free.
Keywords: free-riding; communication; coordination free-riding; communication; coordination
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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MDPI and ACS Style

Andersson, O.; Holm, H.J. Speech Is Silver, Silence Is Golden. Games 2013, 4, 497-507.

AMA Style

Andersson O, Holm HJ. Speech Is Silver, Silence Is Golden. Games. 2013; 4(3):497-507.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Andersson, Ola; Holm, Hakan J. 2013. "Speech Is Silver, Silence Is Golden." Games 4, no. 3: 497-507.


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