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Games 2013, 4(3), 497-507; doi:10.3390/g4030497
Short Note

Speech Is Silver, Silence Is Golden

1,*  and 2
1 Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Grevgatan 34, Stockholm 102 15, Sweden 2 Department of Economics, Lund University, P.O. Box 7082, Lund 220 07, Sweden
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 13 June 2013 / Revised: 16 August 2013 / Accepted: 22 August 2013 / Published: 30 August 2013
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Abstract

This paper experimentally investigates free-riding behavior on communication cost in a coordination game and finds strong indications of such free-riding. Firstly, the subjects wait for others to send a message when communication is costly, which does not happen when communication is costless. Secondly, the proportion of games where no communication or one-way communication takes place is much higher when communication is costly compared to when it is free.
Keywords: free-riding; communication; coordination free-riding; communication; coordination
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0).
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Andersson, O.; Holm, H.J. Speech Is Silver, Silence Is Golden. Games 2013, 4, 497-507.

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