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Speech Is Silver, Silence Is Golden
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Grevgatan 34, Stockholm 102 15, Sweden
Department of Economics, Lund University, P.O. Box 7082, Lund 220 07, Sweden
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 13 June 2013; in revised form: 16 August 2013 / Accepted: 22 August 2013 / Published: 30 August 2013
Abstract: This paper experimentally investigates free-riding behavior on communication cost in a coordination game and finds strong indications of such free-riding. Firstly, the subjects wait for others to send a message when communication is costly, which does not happen when communication is costless. Secondly, the proportion of games where no communication or one-way communication takes place is much higher when communication is costly compared to when it is free.
Keywords: free-riding; communication; coordination
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Cite This Article
MDPI and ACS Style
Andersson, O.; Holm, H.J. Speech Is Silver, Silence Is Golden. Games 2013, 4, 497-507.
Andersson O, Holm HJ. Speech Is Silver, Silence Is Golden. Games. 2013; 4(3):497-507.
Andersson, Ola; Holm, Hakan J. 2013. "Speech Is Silver, Silence Is Golden." Games 4, no. 3: 497-507.