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Games 2013, 4(3), 497-507; doi:10.3390/g4030497
Short Note

Speech Is Silver, Silence Is Golden

1,*  and 2
1 Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Grevgatan 34, Stockholm 102 15, Sweden 2 Department of Economics, Lund University, P.O. Box 7082, Lund 220 07, Sweden
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 13 June 2013 / Revised: 16 August 2013 / Accepted: 22 August 2013 / Published: 30 August 2013
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Abstract

This paper experimentally investigates free-riding behavior on communication cost in a coordination game and finds strong indications of such free-riding. Firstly, the subjects wait for others to send a message when communication is costly, which does not happen when communication is costless. Secondly, the proportion of games where no communication or one-way communication takes place is much higher when communication is costly compared to when it is free.
Keywords: free-riding; communication; coordination free-riding; communication; coordination
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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MDPI and ACS Style

Andersson, O.; Holm, H.J. Speech Is Silver, Silence Is Golden. Games 2013, 4, 497-507.

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