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Games 2011, 2(3), 333-354; https://doi.org/10.3390/g2030333

The Minority of Three-Game: An Experimental and Theoretical Analysis

1
Department of Economics, University of Munich, Ludwigstrasse 59, Munich 80539, Germany
2
Strategic Interaction Group, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Kahlaische Str. 10, Jena 07745, Germany
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 2 March 2011 / Revised: 20 July 2011 / Accepted: 8 August 2011 / Published: 9 September 2011
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Abstract

We report experimental results on the minority of three-game, where three players choose one of two alternatives and the most rewarding alternative is the one chosen by a single player. This coordination game has many asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies that are non-strict and payoff-asymmetric and a unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in which each player’s behavior is based on the toss of a fair coin. This straightforward behavior is predicted by equilibrium selection, impulse-balance equilibrium, and payoff-sampling equilibrium. Experimental participants rely on various decision rules, and only a quarter of them perfectly randomize. View Full-Text
Keywords: coordination; minority game; mixed strategy; learning models; experiments coordination; minority game; mixed strategy; learning models; experiments
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0).

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Chmura, T.; Güth, W. The Minority of Three-Game: An Experimental and Theoretical Analysis. Games 2011, 2, 333-354.

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