Games 2011, 2(3), 333-354; doi:10.3390/g2030333
Article

The Minority of Three-Game: An Experimental and Theoretical Analysis

1,* email and 2email
Received: 2 March 2011; in revised form: 20 July 2011 / Accepted: 8 August 2011 / Published: 9 September 2011
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Abstract: We report experimental results on the minority of three-game, where three players choose one of two alternatives and the most rewarding alternative is the one chosen by a single player. This coordination game has many asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies that are non-strict and payoff-asymmetric and a unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in which each player’s behavior is based on the toss of a fair coin. This straightforward behavior is predicted by equilibrium selection, impulse-balance equilibrium, and payoff-sampling equilibrium. Experimental participants rely on various decision rules, and only a quarter of them perfectly randomize.
Keywords: coordination; minority game; mixed strategy; learning models; experiments
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MDPI and ACS Style

Chmura, T.; Güth, W. The Minority of Three-Game: An Experimental and Theoretical Analysis. Games 2011, 2, 333-354.

AMA Style

Chmura T, Güth W. The Minority of Three-Game: An Experimental and Theoretical Analysis. Games. 2011; 2(3):333-354.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Chmura, Thorsten; Güth, Werner. 2011. "The Minority of Three-Game: An Experimental and Theoretical Analysis." Games 2, no. 3: 333-354.

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