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University of Saint-Etienne, CNRS UMR 5824 GATE Saint-Etienne-Lyon, 42023 Saint- Etienne, France
Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA 24061, USA
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 27 October 2010; in revised form: 25 January 2011 / Accepted: 15 February 2011 / Published: 17 February 2011
Abstract: A new model of strategic networking is developed and analyzed, where an agent’s investment in links is nonspecific. The model comprises a large class of games which are both potential and super- or submodular games. We obtain comparative statics results for Nash equilibria with respect to investment costs for supermodular as well as submodular networking games. We also study supermodular games with potentials. We find that the set of potential maximizers forms a sublattice of the lattice of Nash equilibria and derive comparative statics results for the smallest and the largest potential maximizer. Finally, we provide a broad spectrum of applications from social interaction to industrial organization.
Keywords: social networks; local interaction games; nonspecific networking
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MDPI and ACS Style
Durieu, J.; Haller, H.; Solal, P. Nonspecific Networking. Games 2011, 2, 87-113.
Durieu J, Haller H, Solal P. Nonspecific Networking. Games. 2011; 2(1):87-113.
Durieu, Jacques; Haller, Hans; Solal, Philippe. 2011. "Nonspecific Networking." Games 2, no. 1: 87-113.