Games 2010, 1(1), 18-33; doi:10.3390/g1010018

Punishment, Cooperation, and Cheater Detection in “Noisy” Social Exchange

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Received: 9 December 2009; in revised form: 1 March 2010 / Accepted: 12 March 2010 / Published: 15 March 2010
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Abstract: Explaining human cooperation in large groups of non-kin is a major challenge to both rational choice theory and the theory of evolution. Recent research suggests that group cooperation can be explained by positing that cooperators can punish non-cooperators or cheaters. The experimental evidence comes from public goods games in which group members are fully informed about the behavior of all others and cheating occurs in full view. We demonstrate that under more realistic information conditions, where cheating is less obvious, punishment is much less effective in enforcing cooperation. Evidently, the explanatory power of punishment is constrained by the visibility of cheating.
Keywords: public-goods game; punishment; cooperation; reciprocity; experimental games
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MDPI and ACS Style

Bornstein, G.; Weisel, O. Punishment, Cooperation, and Cheater Detection in “Noisy” Social Exchange. Games 2010, 1, 18-33.

AMA Style

Bornstein G, Weisel O. Punishment, Cooperation, and Cheater Detection in “Noisy” Social Exchange. Games. 2010; 1(1):18-33.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Bornstein, Gary; Weisel, Ori. 2010. "Punishment, Cooperation, and Cheater Detection in “Noisy” Social Exchange." Games 1, no. 1: 18-33.

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