Conditions for Sustainability of the Elephant Marsh Fishery in Malawi
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Small-Scale Fisheries Management in Developing Countries
Ostrom’s Condition/Attribute [10] | Definition of the Condition/Attribute | Variables that Define the Attribute/Condition at the Elephant Marsh Fishery | Current Status of the Condition/Attribute at Elephant Marsh/Justification for Inclusion in the Study |
---|---|---|---|
Clearly defined boundaries at the resource | Individuals or households who have rights to withdraw resource units from the CPR must be clearly defined, as must the boundaries of the CPR itself | Each fishing village has a defined boundary agreed upon by fishers and their leadership, legitimate users (non-outsiders) are known, and the external boundaries of the wetland are clear. | Condition met [22] |
Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions | Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or quantity of resource units (in this case fish) are related to local conditions and to provision rules requiring labor, material, and/or money | Fishers pay small amounts of money to obtain a fishing license, get labor, purchase acceptable fishing gear, have restricted periods of entry into the resource. | Condition met [22] |
Collective choice arrangements | Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying the operational rules | Existence of local democracy, ability to influence or change operational rules, Influence of the chief on choice of fisheries committee leadership? Are women included in the fisheries committee leadership? Boat theft or absence of theft? Do community members trust each other? Are fishers migrating to other fishing villages? For the local situation at the Elephant Marsh, this is attainable if collective social capital at village level is good. | Not clear before this study |
Monitoring | Monitors who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator behavior are accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators | Are the fisheries assistants from government/government officers present? What is the impact of the presence of the government officers? Does their presence have any impact on the communities that use the CPR? Do the officers just come to “police” or they inform and teach fishers other things on fisheries management? | Not clear before this study |
Graduated sanctions | Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be assessed graduated sanctions (depending on seriousness and context of the offense) by other appropriators, by officials accountable to these appropriators or by both | What the status of the local leadership in form of fisheries committee chairman? Actual implementation of the rules by the committee chair? Reputation of the committee chair (Knowledge and ability to act), Presence of own office space for the committee, are by-laws there for implementation, Does the implementation depend on extent/level of offence? Is this really done/ are the by-laws really implemented? | Not clear before this study |
Conflict resolution mechanism | Appropriators and their officials have rapid low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts among appropriators or between appropriators and officials. | Chiefs, fisheries committee leadership, government officials? The hierarchy of conflict resolution (Chiefs, fisheries committee leadership, government officials). Does the chief uphold the roles of the fisheries committee in conflict resolution? | Not clear before this study |
Minimal recognition of rights to organize | The rights of the appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external government authorities | Interference from state? Does the state challenge the right of users to create their own local institution? What roles do the government officers have? What is the optimal role of the state/government agents? | Not clear before this study |
Nested enterprises | Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises | National guiding principles/ government officials? What is their level of support in policy direction and information sharing? Is the fishery operating according to national guidelines? Is there cross-scale cooperation? | Not clear before this study |
3. Study Area
4. Methodology
4.1. Research Variables
- Collective social capital for committee: The actions of the fisheries committee are motivated by several factors including reputation of the leader and communal value attached to fish. This variable was quantified using five attributes: (i) the etic (researchers’ impression) of the quality of the fisheries committee chairperson (knowledge and ability to act); (ii) presence of own fund at fisheries committee level; (iii) availability of a committee-owned structure (building for meetings/office); (iv) presence of written by-laws; and (v) the actual implementation of graduated sanctions to offenders by fisheries committee. Each attribute had a score of 1 resulting in an overall additive maximum of 5 points. As an input variable for data analysis the 5 points were assessed as a score of (1) while anything lower was assessed as (0).
- Collective social capital for the village: When community cohesion is strong, achievement of a common purpose is easier than in an environment of conflict. The score for this attribute was based on (i) collective community effort to keep the sanitary conditions of the beach clean and the existence of local democracy; (ii) boat safety/absence of theft; (iii) inclusiveness of females at the beach (e.g., as fish processors and traders); (iv) willingness to explore trust-based investment (e.g., fishers to give their catch of the day to a trader for sale at a market and only get proceeds after the trader has sold the fish); and (v) migration of fishers to other villages for fishing reasons, (indicator of a “bad beach”). Each attribute had a score of 1 resulting in an overall additive maximum of 5 points. As an input variable for data analysis the 5 points were assessed as a score of (1) while anything lower was assessed as (0).
- Government visits and impact: The score for this attribute was based on the frequency of official visits by government agents and the impact of what they do during the visits. According to Malawi’s Department of Fisheries, government agents are supposed to visit a beach at least twice a month for extension activities. This essentially translates to a minimum of 24 possible visits in a year. The impact of the visits was measured at three levels: (i) “come and look” gave an impact factor of 1; (ii) “come, look and police” gave an impact factor of 2; while (iii) “come, look, teach/inform and police” gave an impact factor of 3. A final score was generated by multiplying the number of visits in a year by the impact factor to give a minimum positive impact score of 72 points (i.e., 24 × 3). As an input variable for data analysis 72 points or more (if there was a higher frequency of visits) were assessed as a score of (1) while anything lower was assessed as (0).
- Chief’s support: Due to the customary arrangement, the chief is important in upholding the roles of the fisheries committee. The score for this attribute was based on whether the chief is supportive or in conflict with the affairs of the fishing site, especially the fisheries committee using three indicators (i) etic impression (e.g., from stories of conflict or other negative allusions); (ii) opinion of fishers, traders and fish processors and (iii) opinion of government officials. Each indicator had a score of 1 resulting in an overall additive maximum of 3 points. As an input variable for data analysis the 3 points were assessed as a score of (1) while anything lower was assessed as (0).
- Sustainability: The score for this attributes is based on the researchers’ objective assessment [53] and insiders’ view (emic) of four indicators (i) stability of catch (abundance overfishing); (ii) quality of catch (non-juveniles for the late maturing Oreochromis and Tilapia species); (iii) trends in the catch per unit effort (CPUE); and (iv) the ability to keep non-community members (immigrants) out of the resource. Each attribute had a score of 1 resulting in an overall additive maximum of 4 points. As an input variable for data analysis the 4 points were assessed as a score of (1) while anything lower was assessed as (0).
4.2. Qualitative Comparative Analysis and the Defining Variables
4.3. Crisp Set QCA and an Overview of the Case Studies
Variable | Abbreviation | Definition | Score |
---|---|---|---|
Collective social capital_ committee | CSC_C | Strong collective social capital at local fisheries committee level | 0 or 1 |
Collective social capital_ village | CSC_V | strong collective social capital at village level | 0 or 1 |
Government Agents | GOV | Presence and influence of government agents | 0 or 1 |
Village chief | CHF | Chief is in conflict the community | 0 or 1 |
Outcome | OTM | Fishery is sustainable | 0 or 1 |
Case ID | Name of Beach | Location | CSC_C | CSC_V | GOV | CHF | OTM |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
I | Nkolimbo | East Bank | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
II | Mwala | East Bank | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
III | Chigwamafumu | East Bank | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
IV | Njale | East Bank | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
V | Namanthongo | East Bank | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
VI | Mpandeni | East Bank | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
VII | Twaya | East Bank | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
VIII | Mchachajemusi | East Bank | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
IX | Bwemba | East Bank | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
X | Chuluchamkango | East Bank | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
XI | Nsambokulira | East Bank | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
XII | Nyangu | East Bank | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
XIII | Nthenda | East Bank | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
XIV | Mitawi | East Bank | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
XV | Thedzi | East Bank | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
XVI | Nyalugwe | East Bank | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
XVII | Nyaulombo | East Bank | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
XVIII | Mchesi | West Bank | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
XIX | Alumenda | West Bank | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
XX | Pindani | West Bank | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
XXI | Bulawayo | West Bank | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
XXII | Chisamba | West Bank | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
XXIII | Ntchenyela | West Bank | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
XXIV | Chambalo | West Bank | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
5. Results and Discussion
Box 1. The overall output of the analytical process.
6. Conclusions
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
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Kosamu, I.B.M. Conditions for Sustainability of the Elephant Marsh Fishery in Malawi. Sustainability 2014, 6, 4010-4027. https://doi.org/10.3390/su6074010
Kosamu IBM. Conditions for Sustainability of the Elephant Marsh Fishery in Malawi. Sustainability. 2014; 6(7):4010-4027. https://doi.org/10.3390/su6074010
Chicago/Turabian StyleKosamu, Ishmael B. M. 2014. "Conditions for Sustainability of the Elephant Marsh Fishery in Malawi" Sustainability 6, no. 7: 4010-4027. https://doi.org/10.3390/su6074010