The Dual Threshold Limit of Financing and Formal Credit Availability with Chinese Rural Households: An Investigation Based on a Large Scale Survey
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- (1)
- Research ideas. This paper constructs a simultaneous equation model and integrates the three stages of the household credit process, i.e., credit demand, credit application, and credit availability, into the same framework to prevent information loss in the sample.
- (2)
- Econometric model. This paper chooses the double sample selection model for analysis, which effectively solves the double sample selection bias caused by credit demand and application.
- (3)
- Data. This paper uses a large number of data samples. A total of 20,000 farmer households in 236 counties in 10 provinces or cities across the country have been collected, representing the demographic widely and well.
2. Literature Review
2.1. No Consideration of the Interrelationship between Different Stages of the Household Credit Process
- (1)
- (2)
- Multi-Probit/Logit model. Feng Xufang [29] and Chu Baojin [30] classified rural households into four categories: having no credit demand, using informal credit channels, using formal credit channels, and using both formal and informal credit channels. A multivariate Logit model was used to examine and compare the factors affecting the formal and informal channel usage of rural households. Zhang Bing and Zhang Ning [9] regarded each type of credit as a case, and divided the sample into three categories: zero-interest informal credit, high-interest informal credit, and formal credit, and used a multivariate Logit model in their analysis.
- (3)
- Ordered Probit/Logit model. Zhang Bing et al. [13] used an ordered Logit model and divided farmers into four categories: non-credit demand, informal channel, semi-formal channel, and formal channel.
- (4)
- (5)
- DSS Model. Li Qinghai et al. [14] constructed a dual sample selection model to identify the factors affecting credit demand, application, and approval, and incorporated the credit process into the same framework for analysis.
- (1)
- OLS model. Tong Xinle et al. [26] used multiple linear regression models to identify the factors influencing the actual credit amount of farmers.
- (2)
- Tobit I model. Yi Xiaolan [24] used this model to identify the factors affecting the formal credit availability by measuring the actual ratio of credit approval amount over application amount. Wang Changyun et al. [22] used this model to formalize rural households and identify factors influencing the credit scale. Jin Han and Li Hongbin [33] and Hu Feng and Chen Yuyu [32] used two independent Tobit I models to identify the factors affecting the scale of rural formal and informal financial channels.
- (3)
- Simultaneous Binary Tobit I model (Bitobit model). He Guanghui and Yang Xianyue [34] adopted this model to analyze the interaction between formal and informal financial channels, and identify the factors affecting the amount approved by different channels.
2.2. Consider the Interaction between Different Stages of the Rural Household Credit Process
3. The Econometric Model
3.1. Dual Sample Selection Model
3.2. Variable Definition
4. Data and Empirical Results
4.1. Data Source
4.2. Estimation Results
5. Model Comparison, Robustness Test and Further Investigation
5.1. Model Comparison
5.2. Robustness Test
6. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A
Variable | Credit Demand | Credit Approval | ||
---|---|---|---|---|
Coefficient | Standard Error | Coefficient | Standard Error | |
AGE | 0.0128 | 0.0543 | 0.0637 ** | 0.021 |
AGE2 | −0.0004 | 0.0001 | −0.0009 | 0.0012 |
EDU | 0.0566 ** | 0.0124 | 0.0007 * | 0.0107 |
POP | 0.2140 *** | 0.0754 | 0.0361 | 0.3389 |
LA | −0.1865 | 0.0812 | −0.0554 | 0.0017 |
MIGRATE | −0.2104 ** | 0.0753 | — | — |
PERLAND | 0.1046 *** | 0.0209 | 0.154 | 0.1951 |
INCSTR | 0.0944 ** | 0.0453 | 0.0827 ** | 0.0116 |
RICH | 0.205 | 0.0213 | 0.1236 ** | 0.2123 |
SAVINGS | −1.0900 *** | 0.0404 | −0.0123 | 0.0233 |
MESSAGE | — | — | — | — |
RANK | — | — | 1.072 | — |
TOLERANCE | — | — | −0.0815 | 0.0516 |
BRAN | — | — | 0.1533 | 0.0982 |
TIME | — | — | −0.1516 | 0.2014 |
INFORMAL | — | — | 0.1161 | 0.0234 |
EXCLUSION | — | — | −0.2056 | 0.0198 |
EAST | −0.0987 | 0.0608 | 0.1404 | 0.0445 |
MIDDLE | −0.653 *** | 0.0432 | −0.2321 ** | 0.0623 |
INTERCEPT | −2.0637 *** | 0.5869 | -0.8491 | 1. 0178 |
Total Sample Size: 19,992 | Log of pseudo likelihood = −24,022.36 | |||
Credit demander: 9909 | Equation Correlation = 0.3845[0.1254] ** | |||
Credit available: 3090 |
Variable | Credit Application | Credit Approval | ||
---|---|---|---|---|
Coefficient | Standard Error | Coefficient | Standard Error | |
AGE | 0.0118 | 0.0266 | 0.0132 * | 0.0028 |
AGE2 | −0.0002 | 0.1229 | −0.0034 | 0.0032 |
EDU | 0.0017 ** | 0.6679 | 0.0215 ** | 0.0432 |
POP | 0.0809 * | 0.0421 | 0.2341 | 0.0083 |
LA | — | — | −0.0521 | 0.0796 |
MIGRATE | −0.2818 | 0.0683 | 0.1024 * | 0.0923 |
PERLAND | 0.1924 * | 0.8463 | 0.0321 | 0.0853 |
INCSTR | — | — | 0.8602 * | 0.0249 |
RICH | −0.0236 | 0.0902 | 0.022 *** | 0.982 |
SAVINGS | −0.1555 * | 0.0097 | −0.0031 | 0.0004 |
MESSAGE | 0.1344 | — | 0.0421 * | 0.0053 |
RANK | — | — | 0.5420 | 0.0043 |
TOLERANCE | 0.11245 * | 0.083 | 0.0023 ** | 0.0630 |
BRAN | 0.1281 | 0.1053 | 0.1750 | 0.0908 |
TIME | 0.0015 ** | 0.6723 | 0.7820 *** | 0.0056 |
INFORMAL | 0.0926 | 0.7523 | 0.3051 ** | 0.0012 |
EXCLUSION | 2.3022 | 0.859 | 1.9821 * | 0.0316 |
EAST | 0.2348 ** | 0.5017 | 0.0329 ** | 0.0031 |
MIDDLE | −0.0606 * | 0.2482 | −0.8459 ** | 0.0083 |
INTERCEPT | −0.2403 | 0.63 | −1.521 *** | 0.0826 |
Total Sample Size: 9099 | Log of pseudo likelihood = −19,832.55 | |||
Credit Application: 3984 | Equation Correlation = 0.2751[0.452] * | |||
Credit available: 3090 |
Variable | Credit Demand | Credit Application | Credit Availability | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Coefficient | Standard Error | Coefficient | Standard Error | Coefficient | Standard Error | |
AGE | 0.0148 | 0.0092 | 0.0207 | 0.0132 | 0.1114 *** | 0.0034 |
AGE2 | −0.0002 | 0.0001 | −0.0004 | 0.0002 | −0.0013 *** | 0.0002 |
EDU | 0.0602 *** | 0.0021 | 0.0230 | 0.0236 | −0.0013 | 0.0432 |
POP | 0.2218 *** | 0.0421 | 0.1829 ** | 0.0628 | 0.0782 | 0.0991 |
LABORTE | −0.1791 ** | 0.0623 | — | — | 0.1223 | 0.1145 |
MIGRATE | −0.1804 ** | 0.0751 | −0.4823 *** | 0.1040 | — | — |
PERLAND | 0.1102 *** | 0.0183 | 0.2303 *** | 0.0238 | 0.1538 *** | 0.0522 |
INCSTR | 0.0873 ** | 0.0216 | — | — | 0.1370 | 0.1036 |
RICH | 0.1254 *** | 0.0136 | -0.0374 | 0.0498 | 0.2260 ** | 0.0664 |
SAVINGS | −1.2080 *** | 0.0219 | −0.2495 *** | 0.0030 | 0.0229 | 0.0455 |
MESSAGE | — | — | 1.0982 *** | 0.0342 | — | — |
RANK | — | — | — | — | 1.4673 *** | 0.0034 |
TOLERANCE | — | — | 0.2352 *** | 0.0621 | −0.1676 | 0.0072 |
BRAN | — | — | 0.2521 *** | 0.0484 | 0. 3531 *** | 0.2322 |
TIME | — | — | 0.0035 | 0.0522 | −0.3527 ** | 0.0246 |
INFORMAL | — | — | 0.1304 *** | 0.0463 | 0.2316 * | 0.0842 |
EXCLUSION | — | — | 3.4234 *** | 0.5148 | −0.8522 | 0.6058 |
EAST | −0.0573 | 0.0241 | 0.4516 *** | 0.0750 | 0.3752 ** | 0.072 |
MIDDLE | −0.601 *** | 0.004 | −0.1410 *** | 0.0605 | −0.032 | 0.093 |
INTERCEPT | −2.2218 *** | 0.2362 | −4.8406 *** | 0.6074 | −1.223 | 1.0878 |
Total Sample Size: 17,992 Credit demander: 8819 Credit applicant: 3464 Credit available: 2802 | Log of pseudo likelihood = −19,232.91 Equation correlation coefficient, R21 = 0.4214[0.1573]**, R31 = 0.7234[0.2032] ***, R32 = 0.2462 [0.1331] * Joint Hypothesis Test : R21 = R31 = R32 = 0 Chi2(3) = 16.24, Prob > Chi2 = 0.012 |
Variable | Credit Demand | Credit Application | Credit Availability | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Coefficient | Standard Error | Coefficient | Standard Error | Coefficient | Standard Error | |
AGE | 0.0021 | 0.0023 | 0.0206 | 0.0092 | 0.1128 *** | 0.0027 |
AGE2 | −0.0014 | 0.0004 | −0.0004 | 0.0002 | −0.0034 *** | 0.0004 |
EDU | 0.0321 * | 0.0086 | 0.0221 | 0.0298 | −0.0014 | 0.0256 |
POP | 0.4218 ** | 0.0976 | 0.1809 ** | 0.0623 | 0.0429 | 0.0164 |
LABORTE | −0.6537 | 0.0743 | — | — | 0.4625 | 0.4520 |
MIGRATE | −0.2315 * | 0.1764 | −0.4753 *** | 0.1338 | — | — |
PERLAND | 0.2553 * | 0.0964 | 0.2336 *** | 0.0329 | 0.1542 *** | 0.0422 |
INCSTR | 0.0662 ** | 0.0153 | — | — | 0.1365 | 0.1136 |
RICH | 0.4284 ** | 0.0236 | −0.0231 | 0.0873 | 0.2256 ** | 0.0668 |
SAVINGS | −1.4153 ** | 0.0557 | −0.1482 *** | 0.0028 | 0.0129 | 0.0355 |
MESSAGE | — | — | 1.0913 *** | 0.0048 | — | — |
RANK | — | — | — | — | 1.1323 *** | 0.0304 |
TOLERANCE | — | — | 0.1493 *** | 0.0282 | −0.2004 | 0.0053 |
BRAN | — | — | 0.2215 *** | 0.0736 | 0.3451 *** | 0.218 |
TIME | — | — | 0.0032 | 0.0232 | −0.2852 ** | 0.029 |
INFORMAL | — | — | 0.1934 *** | 0.0291 | 0.2367 * | 0.094 |
EXCLUSION | — | — | 3.4234 *** | 0.5148 | −0.8792 | 0.698 |
EAST | −0.0427 | 0.0128 | 0.4516 *** | 0.0750 | 0.3751 ** | 0.062 |
MIDDLE | −0.2421 ** | 0.0064 | −0.1410 *** | 0.0605 | −0.0583 | 0.0089 |
INTERCEPT | −2.3145 * | 0.2215 | −4.8406 *** | 0.6074 | −1.224 | 1.0983 |
Total Sample Size: 19,992 Credit demander: 11183 Credit applicant: 5321 Credit available: 3090 | Log of pseudo likelihood = −20,184.187 Equation correlation coefficient, R21 = 0.372[0.2458]*, R31 = 0.7213[0.1405] **, R32 = 0.2642 [0.802] *** Joint Hypothesis Test : R21 = R31 = R32 = 0 Chi2(3) = 15.72, Prob > Chi2 = 0.0189 |
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Variable | Definition | Description | No Credit Demand | Credit Demand | Demand, No Application | Demand and Application | Applied but Rejected | Approved |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Sample Size | 10,003 | 9909 | 5862 | 4047 | 957 | 3090 | ||
AGE | Average Age | Age of sample ≥ 16 | 40.8 | 39.31 | 39.62 | 38.88 | 39.19 | 38.79 |
EDU | Highest Degree | Edu = 3, University or above | 1.3 | 1.29 | 1.29 | 1.3 | 1.27 | 1.31 |
Edu = 2, Junior high school | ||||||||
Edu = 1, Junior school; | ||||||||
Edu = 0, others | ||||||||
POP | Family Resident Population | Total family resident population at end of year | 3.94 | 4.09 | 4.07 | 4.11 | 4.13 | 4.11 |
LA | Labor Force Proportion | Ratio of people over 16 to family resident population | 0.7282 | 0.7062 | — | — | 0.702 | 0.707 |
MIGRATE | Migrate Workers Proportion | Ratio of migrant workers to family resident population | 0.1593 | 0.1435 | 0.1567 | 0.1243 | — | — |
PERLAND | Per Capita Actual Cultivated area | UNIT: Mu/Person | 2.39 | 2.36 | 2.71 | 4.3 | 3.8 | 4.45 |
INCSTR | Is Primary income source agriculture? | If Yes, value = 1; | 0.609 | 0.6974 | — | — | 0.7315 | 0.767 |
If No, value = 0; | ||||||||
RICH | Household Wealth Status | Whether Income is greater than the per capita income of the city. | 0.3729 | 0.355 | 0.3738 | 0.3926 | 0.3469 | 0.4068 |
SAVINGS | Are there savings in a formal financial institution? | If Yes, value = 1; | 0.6586 | 0.3714 | 0.3999 | 0.3301 | 0.3009 | 0.3393 |
If No, value = 0; | ||||||||
MESSAGE | Knowledge about microfinance | If Yes, Value = 1 | — | — | 0.6377 | 0.8129 | — | — |
If No, Value = 0 | ||||||||
RANK | Have credit rating? | If Yes, Value = 1 | — | — | — | — | 0.2079 | 0.5821 |
If No, Value = 0 | ||||||||
TOLERANCE | Interest rate tolerance | Willing to pay more interest for urgent needs? If yes, value = 1; if no, value = 0 | — | — | 0.7044 | 0.7517 | 0.7753 | 0.7443 |
BRAN | Is there a financial network in the village? | If Yes, Value = 1 | — | — | 0.3753 | 0.4695 | 0.3929 | 0.4934 |
If No, Value = 0 | ||||||||
TIME | Time to nearest network | Hours to Nearest Network? | — | — | 0.367 | 0.3695 | 0.4004 | 0.36 |
INFORMAL | Are there any private interest-bearing credit systems in the local area? | If Yes, Value = 1 | — | — | 0.3192 | 0.3956 | 0.3595 | 0.4066 |
If No, Value = 0 | ||||||||
EXCLUSION | Financial exclusion intensity of the province? | Obtained according to the factor analysis method. | — | — | 0.8195 | 0.8424 | 0.8449 | 0.8417 |
EAST | Located in Eastern China | If Yes, Value = 1 | 0.2281 | 0.1712 | 0.1866 | 0.149 | 0.1317 | 0.1541 |
If No, Value = 0 | ||||||||
MIDDLE | Located in Central China | If Yes, Value = 1 | 0.5127 | 0.4873 | 0.4628 | 0.5226 | 0.5319 | 0.5199 |
If No, Value = 0 |
Inner Mongolia | Jilin | Jiangsu | Anhui | Fujian | Henan | Hunan | Sichuan | Guizhou | Ningxia | Total | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Sample Size | 2000 | 2000 | 2000 | 2000 | 2000 | 2040 | 2000 | 2000 | 2000 | 2000 | 20,040 |
No Need (%) | 37.4 | 39.4 | 67.5 | 63.2 | 49.7 | 59.5 | 58.2 | 54.9 | 44.6 | 36.2 | 53.9 |
Needs (%) | 62.6 | 60.6 | 32.5 | 36.8 | 50.3 | 40.5 | 41.8 | 45.1 | 55.4 | 63.8 | 46.1 |
Own Deposit Can Meet Funding Needs | Without Good Project | No Habit of Using Credit | Work Outside and No Funding Needs | Others | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Total | 60.5 | 12.5 | 14 | 10.2 | 2.8 |
Inner Mongolia | 74.1 | 15.3 | 7 | 1.5 | 2.1 |
Jilin | 82.6 | 6.3 | 8.5 | 1.1 | 1.5 |
Jiangsu | 54.4 | 11.2 | 17.4 | 14.3 | 2.7 |
Anhui | 60.2 | 12 | 12.7 | 12.7 | 2.4 |
Fujian | 50.4 | 20 | 15.8 | 8.7 | 5.1 |
Henan | 63.1 | 12.3 | 14.3 | 8 | 2.3 |
Hunan | 69.6 | 10.4 | 9.7 | 8 | 2.3 |
Sichuan | 49.9 | 12.1 | 17.1 | 18.1 | 2.8 |
Guizhou | 53.8 | 16.4 | 19 | 4.2 | 6.6 |
Ningxia | 74.3 | 12.6 | 7.2 | 4.2 | 1.7 |
Worry about the Payment Ability | Interest or Other Cost is High | Worry about Not Being Approved | Others | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Total | 10.72 | 37.81 | 18.54 | 32.93 |
Inner Mongolia | 9.11 | 36.43 | 14.78 | 39.68 |
Jilin | 12.97 | 45.75 | 6.13 | 35.15 |
Jiangsu | 7.91 | 36.83 | 13.78 | 41.48 |
Anhui | 3.39 | 20.61 | 12.31 | 63.69 |
Fujian | 8.99 | 26.51 | 30.83 | 33.67 |
Henan | 7.21 | 39.42 | 28.69 | 24.68 |
Hunan | 6.31 | 29.87 | 27.21 | 36.61 |
Sichuan | 13.71 | 46.2 | 7.6 | 32.49 |
Guizhou | 22.68 | 37.07 | 12.02 | 28.23 |
Ningxia | 7.74 | 44.41 | 19.34 | 28.51 |
No Collateral | No Relationship | No Payment Capability | Has Existing Credit | Others | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Total | 23.83 | 33.36 | 7.73 | 7.57 | 27.51 |
Inner Mongolia | 24.6 | 34.1 | 5.4 | 7.8 | 28.1 |
Jilin | 22.9 | 24.1 | 8.4 | 27.7 | 16.9 |
Jiangsu | 13.5 | 18.9 | 6.3 | 0.9 | 60.4 |
Anhui | 29.9 | 33.6 | 8.4 | 9.3 | 18.8 |
Fujian | 16.5 | 36.3 | 7.1 | 3.3 | 36.8 |
Henan | 28 | 41.3 | 7.7 | 4.2 | 18.8 |
Hunan | 17 | 40.6 | 15.1 | 6.6 | 20.7 |
Sichuan | 33.7 | 29.5 | 5.3 | 7.4 | 24.1 |
Guizhou | 25.2 | 31.7 | 6.4 | 13.9 | 22.8 |
Ningxia | 27.7 | 31.9 | 7.2 | 12 | 21.2 |
Variable | Credit Demand | Credit Application | Credit Availability | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Coefficient | Standard Error | Coefficient | Standard Error | Coefficient | Standard Error | |
AGE | 0.0154 | 0.0146 | 0.0197 | 0.0222 | 0.1113 *** | 0.0389 |
AGE2 | −0.0002 | 0.0002 | −0.0004 | 0.0003 | −0.0014 *** | 0.0004 |
EDU | 0.0605 *** | 0.0221 | 0.0330 | 0.0416 | -0.0012 | 0.0560 |
POP | 0.2070 *** | 0.0605 | 0.1927 ** | 0.0878 | 0.0781 | 0.1599 |
LABORTE | −0.1765 ** | 0.0837 | — | — | 0.1024 | 0.2176 |
MIGRATE | −0.2104 ** | 0.0921 | −0.5033 *** | 0.1340 | — | — |
PERLAND | 0.1046 *** | 0.0283 | 0.3103 *** | 0.0368 | 0.1851 *** | 0.0633 |
INCSTR | 0.0913 ** | 0.0366 | — | — | 0.1230 | 0.1006 |
RICH | 0.1351 *** | 0.0336 | −0.0375 | 0.0478 | 0.2060 ** | 0.0873 |
SAVINGS | −1.1600 *** | 0.0319 | −0.2835 *** | 0.0470 | 0.0235 | 0.0885 |
MESSAGE | — | — | 1.1206 *** | 0.0504 | — | — |
RANK | — | — | — | — | 1.6417 *** | 0.0895 |
TOLERANCE | — | — | 0.2249 *** | 0.0494 | −0.1476 | 0.0938 |
BRAN | — | — | 0.2418 *** | 0.0461 | 0.2351 *** | 0.0842 |
TIME | — | — | 0.0029 | 0.0582 | −0.2597 ** | 0.1046 |
INFORMAL | — | — | 0.1404 *** | 0.0466 | 0.1316 * | 0.0841 |
EXCLUSION | — | — | 3.4362 *** | 0.5182 | −0.8939 | 0.8058 |
EAST | −0.0773 | 0.0523 | 0.4516 *** | 0.0750 | 0.3234 ** | 0.1458 |
MIDDLE | −0.5948 *** | 0.0425 | −0.1410 *** | 0.0605 | −0.0381 | 0.1084 |
INTERCEPT | −2.2016 *** | 0.4069 | −4.8406 *** | 0.6074 | −1.3023 | 1.0878 |
Total Sample Size: 19,992 Credit demander: 9909 Credit applicant: 4047 Credit available: 3090 | Log of pseudo likelihood = −20,428.14 Equation correlation coefficient, R21 = 0.4063[0.1474] **, R31 = 0.5737[0.2394] ***, R32 = 0.2356[0.1331] ** Joint Hypothesis Test: R21 = R31 = R32 = 0 Chi2(3) = 13.24, Prob > Chi2 = 0.018 |
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Qin, L.; Ren, R.; Li, Q. The Dual Threshold Limit of Financing and Formal Credit Availability with Chinese Rural Households: An Investigation Based on a Large Scale Survey. Sustainability 2018, 10, 3577. https://doi.org/10.3390/su10103577
Qin L, Ren R, Li Q. The Dual Threshold Limit of Financing and Formal Credit Availability with Chinese Rural Households: An Investigation Based on a Large Scale Survey. Sustainability. 2018; 10(10):3577. https://doi.org/10.3390/su10103577
Chicago/Turabian StyleQin, Long, Ruoen Ren, and Qinghai Li. 2018. "The Dual Threshold Limit of Financing and Formal Credit Availability with Chinese Rural Households: An Investigation Based on a Large Scale Survey" Sustainability 10, no. 10: 3577. https://doi.org/10.3390/su10103577